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SUMMARY 
This study was intended to develop a tool to measure safety orientation (SO) in shipping. 
SO should be considered a practical safety culture assessment instrument, indicating the 
degree of orientation towards safety in a group or an organisation. The definition of the 
construct follows below: 
“Safety orientation consists of the cultural and contextual factors that create the attitudes 
and behaviour that influence occupational health and safety. Organisations with a positive 
safety orientation are characterised by a perception of the importance of health and safety, 
and by confidence in the efficacy of their chosen measures to create the necessary 
behaviour for avoiding or limiting accidents and to continuously improve health and 
safety.” (Håvold, 2005a p.97). 
 
An extensive literature search in the maritime and safety fields revealed that there has been 
almost no previous research dealing with safety culture in the maritime context. The study 
therefore examines the literature dealing with safety culture and climate in areas other than 
shipping. Many of the factors identified by these investigations assisted the study in the 
development of a first culture assessment instrument to measure SO at sea. Paper 1 is a 
review paper covering culture in maritime safety, Paper 3 reviews newer scales used for 
measuring safety culture in different industries leading to the safety orientation definition 
and model.  Paper 4 tests safety culture theory and hypotheses on a sample of seafarers on 
Norwegian-owned vessels. Paper 6 validates and simplifies the scales and items presented 
in Paper 3.   
 
The main study was designed to represent as broadly as possible the safety attitudes, safety 
climate and safety culture of seafarers employed aboard Norwegian-owned vessels.  
The study was based on a quantitative research approach using two questionnaires for data 
gathering, generating two datasets. These datasets provide the basis upon which the analyses 
were conducted. The total number of seafarers who participated in the two surveys 
numbered more than 2800. Analysis of the datasets enabled the safety orientation construct 
to be described comprehensively and to be tested using different quantitative methods. 
Details of the methods, results and implications can be seen in Papers 4 and 6.   
 
Further work is needed to verify the empirical results and refine the safety orientation 
construct and model. This can be done by applying the model and validating it with new 
samples of seafarers. 
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 Introduction  
 
1.1 Purpose, overall aims and rationale  
 
This thesis focuses on defining, describing and testing a safety orientation (SO) construct. 
The research aims fall into two categories; to contribute to theory testing of selected 
hypotheses related to safety culture (Papers 4 and 5) and to contribute to the development of 
a tool to measure safety orientation in shipping (Papers 3 and 6). However, the main 
purpose is to develop a tool to measure SO in shipping.  
SO is closely related to, and can be looked at as, an operational definition of safety culture. 
The SO model is presented in Figure 1.1 and a definition of safety orientation is presented 
on p. 2.  
 
 
 
Figure 1.1 Preliminary model describing; 
 Factors and consequence of safety 
 orientation (Håvold, 2005a p.98 ) 
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The idea of SO emerged from scientific papers on organisational culture and climate, safety 
culture and climate, marketing orientation, organisational learning and psychological 
literature, all of which discuss the link between attitude and behaviour. Theories influencing 
the safety orientation model and definition are presented in Chapter 3 and the factors 
included in the safety orientation model (Figure 1.1) are described in more detail in Chapter 
4 and in Papers 3 and 6. 
 
A definition of safety orientation has been proposed in Paper 3: 
“Safety orientation consists of the cultural and contextual factors that create the attitudes 
and behaviour that influence occupational health and safety. Organisations with a positive 
safety orientation are characterised by a perception of the importance of health and safety, 
and by confidence in the efficacy of their chosen measures to create the necessary 
behaviour for avoiding or limiting accidents and to continuously improve health and 
safety.” (Paper 3: Håvold, 2005a p.97). 
 
 
Parts of the model have been tested in a maritime context as a step towards developing a 
tool to measure safety orientation in shipping. A strong focus on performance measurement 
coupled with reporting on safety performance to stakeholders seems to help in raising an 
understanding of safety as a strategic business objective and thereby improves decisions and 
safety performance in organisations (Fuller, 1999; HSE, 2001). A more detailed discussion 
can be found in Paper 2: Mearns and Håvold (2003).  
 
The process of developing the tool that is reported in this thesis is outlined below:  
1. Review of safety climate and safety culture papers, and relate them to maritime    
safety.  
2. Propose a definition of a “new” construct: “safety orientation”.  
3. Draw a preliminary model of antecedents, context and outcomes related to safety 
orientation. 
4. Describe safety orientation and test some of its antecedents/factors using surveys     
conducted aboard Norwegian-owned vessels. 
5. Explore if the most important factors of safety orientation are transferable from 
other industries to the maritime industry.  
6. Explore the consistency in attitudes among groups of employees on Norwegian-
owned vessels, for example based on occupation, nationalities, vessels and ship 
owners. 
7. Validate the safety orientation model by using confirmatory factor analysis. 
8. Evaluate a simplified model of “safety orientation” on the basis of the studies 
(safety orientation revisited).  
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Safety, health and environment (SHE) is important ashore, but may be more so at sea 
because seafarers are often far from hospitals and doctors if something happens.  
 
In 1997 the HSE published a report entitled The Cost of Accidents in which they claim that 
incidents might account for as much as 37 per cent of annualised profits for a transport 
company, 8.5 per cent of the tender price for a construction company and 5 per cent of 
running cost for a hospital (HSE, 1997).  Paper 2 (Mearns and Håvold, 2003)  discusses in 
more detail how accidents can influence both organisations and individuals, and how a large 
accident can be damaging for a company and result in production losses, lower quality and 
lost goodwill, as well as affecting worker morale, and at its worst, even lead to bankruptcy.  
 
According to the International Maritime Organization (IMO), shipping is one of the most 
dangerous of all the world's industries. The organisation states that the best way to improve 
safety at sea is by developing international regulations and for companies to work with 
safety culture. The IMO further maintains that the key to achieving a safety culture is to 
recognise that accidents are preventable through following correct procedures and 
established best practice; and by constantly thinking safety and seeking continuous 
improvement (www.imo.org).  
 
It is important to work with safety in shipping because occupations at sea are high risk 
compared to most other occupations. The relative difference in fatal injuries between the 
workforces ashore and at sea seems not to have diminished over the years (Statistical 
Yearbook, 2000), a fact supported by a survey carried out amongst Danish seafarers from 
1986 to 1993 (Hanson, 1996), which showed that fatal injuries at sea were 11.5 times higher 
than average rates among the Danish male workforce ashore. Roberts and Marlow (2005) 
subsequently found that the mortality rate in British merchant shipping during the years 
from 1976 to 2002 was 27.6 times higher than in the general workforce in Great Britain at 
the same time. These findings demonstrate that both the companies and the maritime 
industry have the potential to improve safety performance substantially, and indicate 
therefore the need for research on safety at sea.  
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1.2 Main research questions 
 
Håvold (2000) reviewed culture in maritime safety in Paper 1. The review indicated that no 
research had been done on safety culture and climate in shipping, a finding later confirmed 
by Sten and Fjerdingen (2003). Most safety climate and culture research had been done on 
offshore oil platforms, nuclear power production, air and rail transport, chemical factories 
and construction work. The question then becomes whether it is possible to transfer findings 
and factors found in industry and air safety to maritime safety. Would a survey of seafarers 
show the same dimensions as other industries, indicating that there might be an “industry 
standard?”  
 
The paper’s research questions were related to building and testing the safety orientation 
model, and testing theory for the practical use of the SO construct: 
 Question 1: Are safety culture factors found from studies in other industries 
transferable to a maritime context?  
 
Question 2: Are the most important factors found in other industries also the most 
important in a maritime context? 
 
Question 3: Model building: Is it possible to build and test a model measuring safety 
orientation in shipping based on a review of literature covering safety culture? 
 
Question 4: Is it possible to find factors/dimensions that discriminate sufficiently among 
vessels, occupations, nations and other factors to become a useful tool in the improvement 
of safety? 
 
Question 5: Validation: If safety orientation can be measured in this way, which dimensions 
can be used to measure it; and how does these dimensions relate to what is known about 
safety and risk from existing theory and research?  
 
 
The hypothesis is that safety orientation is partly predetermined by organisations, industry, 
nationality, and task. In operational terms, the issue is whether membership in one 
organisation or group rather than another explains a significant share of the variance in 
member answers to questions dealing with safety-related matters.  
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1.3 Assumptions 
 
Safety culture and safety climate are seen as the same construct. Guldenmund (2000), who 
lists 18 definitions of safety culture and safety climate in a review paper, says that some 
authors perceive safety climate and culture as separate constructs (safety culture is 
manifested through safety climate) and some perceive the two as one phenomenon.  
 
The absence of a large accident in the history of an organisation does not prove that the 
organisation is a safe one or even that it has a better safety orientation than other 
organisations. Research shows that a company can have LTI-rates close to zero and still 
have a relative high probability of a large accident (Hovden, 2001). Many organisations 
with nearly error free records have a track record of concealed accident and safety breaches 
(Sagan, 1993). So a low accident rate even over a period of many years is no guarantee that 
risks are being controlled. This might be particularly true in organisations where there are 
low probabilities of accidents, but where major hazards are present.  
 
One might make distinctions between proactive and reactive methods (Kristiansen, 2005). 
A reactive approach is based on knowledge about historical accidents while a proactive 
approach is built on an understanding of the causes of accidents and organisational 
knowledge. SO can be used to predict and prevent accidents from happening in the future 
and are as such a proactive approach.     
 
Management and owners might have an intrinsic interest in communicating that their 
organisation are safe because organisations that are perceived as safe are more attractive 
customers for insurance companies and banks, more attractive for local communities and 
present and future employees, as well as for investors, suppliers and customers (is discussed 
in Paper 2: Mearns and Håvold, 2003).  Managers might therefore give biased answers if 
asked about safety. It is therefore important to ask or observe the people at the sharp end, 
the sailors on the vessels, to determine their values, norms, attitudes, beliefs and actions to 
get to know the antecedents to safe or unsafe behaviour in an organisation.  
 
 One has to bear in mind that no organisation is just in business for being safe; most 
businesses are in business for reasons such as earning long-term profits for their owners. 
But one cannot argue that being safe has no bearing on long-term profitability; for example, 
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Germaniche Lloyd states clearly on its web page: “Central to our thinking is the optimising 
of operational safety and the associated increases in profitability we achieve for our 
clients” (http://www.gl-group.com/start.htm). Paper 2 discusses also the costs of not including 
health and safety in the calculation of long-term profits, and the fact that many people do 
not realise how expensive accidents are. 
 
1.4 Delimitations and their justification 
 
The main paradigm in this thesis is that elements of culture are measurable by using 
questionnaires and quantitative methods. Traditionally, culture as a scientific topic in social 
sciences was studied by anthropologists.  Since the 1980s an ongoing debate on whether 
culture can be measured using quantitative methods seems to have split the scientific 
society in two. Some are opposed to the idea (e.g. Trice and Beyer, 1993); others see no 
profound objections (e. g. Hofstede, 1991 and 2001 and Bernard, 1988). A mixed approach 
(quantitative and qualitative research) with in-depth interviews, observational or action 
research in addition to surveys would certainly have improved the validity of my research, 
but the lack of time and money left me with a quantitative research design.  
 
There are many threats to external validity that cause the results of a study to be specific to 
some limited group of people and/or set of conditions. These threats are (a) those dealing 
with generalisations to populations (What population of subjects can be expected to behave 
in the same way as the sample subjects?), and (b) those dealing with the "environment" of 
the study (Under what conditions, i.e., settings, treatments, experimenters, dependent 
variables, and so on, can the same results be expected?).  
 
By limiting the scope of research to a sample of seafarers working on Norwegian-owned 
vessels only, the research employing the chosen research methods could be conducted 
within an acceptable time limit. By choosing a sample spread all over the world and 
moving all the time, the research methods chosen were feasible and accomplishable. By 
defining the objectives of this research as a step towards the development of a model, 
indicators, and a methodology for measuring safety orientation at sea, any compilation of 
information can be deemed as a positive contribution by adding to our understanding of 
various aspects surrounding safety at sea. 
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1.5 Structure of the thesis  
The thesis consists of six papers. The links between the six papers and the introduction and 
conclusions can be seen in Figure 1.2.  
The first paper reviewed “safety culture” in a maritime context and found that no 
research on safety climate/culture had been done in that industry up to 1998.  Literature 
and findings are updated in later papers and in the framework of the thesis. The second 
paper discussed the reasons why health and safety should be reported in a balanced 
scorecard (BSC) and which indicators measuring health and safety should be chosen to 
populate the scorecard. Interviews were conducted with senior managers about the use 
of BSC with regards to health and safety indicators.  
 The third paper reviewed measures of safety culture and climate and discussed factors 
and items with respect to factor name and importance, reliability and validity. A new 
and more practical construct called “safety orientation” was proposed. The fourth paper 
tested theory and hypotheses related to safety culture. The fifth paper discuss national 
culture‘s influence on the SO core model.  The sixth paper validated the SO core model. 
Figure 1.2  Structure of the thesis.
Paper 2. 
Occupational health and safety and the 
balanced scorecard. 
(Published in The TQM Magazine, 15(6), 
408-423; 2003).
Paper 4. 
Safety culture in a Norwegian 
shipping company. 
(Published in Journal of Safety Research, 
36, 441-458; 2005).
Paper 1. 
Culture in maritime safety. 
(Published in Maritime Policy and 
Management, 27(1), 79-88; 2000). 
Paper 3.
Measuring Occupational Safety: 
From Safety Culture to Safety Orientation? 
(Published in Policy and Practice in 
Health and Safety, 03(1), 85-105; 2005).
Paper 6. 
From safety culture to safety orientation: 
Validation and simplification of a safety 
orientation scale using a sample of seafarers 
working for Norwegian ship owners. 
(Submitted to an international scientific journal).
Paper 5.
National cultures and safety orientation: 
A study of seafarers working for Norwegian 
shipping companies. (Published in Work & Stress, 
21(2), 173-195; 2007).
Introduction and conclusions. 
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2 Background  
 
History is a tool not only for remembering the past but also for shaping our 
understanding of the present. In the analysis of an industry or a national tradition, history 
is important. Every nation and industry shapes its values and culture in a historical context.  
 
2.1 Norway as a shipping nation 
 
In the Viking era the ship became an important symbol of knowledge and power. The 
shipbuilders at that time went for lightness, strength and resilience in their vessels. Vikings 
were knowledgeable about shipbuilding, seamanship and navigation. A Viking with a large 
longship that had been decorated with carvings was a powerful man. Besides allowing the 
Vikings to travel great distances, their longships provided tactical advantages in battles 
since they could perform very efficient hit-and-run attacks, in which they attacked quickly 
and unexpectedly and left before a counter-offensive could be launched. Longships could 
also sail in shallow waters, allowing the Vikings to travel far inland along rivers (Forte et 
al., 2005). The Vikings founded cities such as Jorvik (York), Kyvi and Dublin. The 
Norwegians travelled most to the north-west and west, to the Faroe Islands, Orkney, Ireland 
and the northern parts of England. Apart from Britain and Ireland, Norwegians mostly 
found largely uninhabited land and established settlements such as Iceland and Greenland, 
and at about the year 1000 A.D., North America (Vinland) was discovered (Atkinson, I., 
1979; Christensen, A.E., 1982). 
 
 In the 18th century the Norwegian fishing industry flourished, lumbering became an 
important industry, the merchant class grew, and Norway became a naval power. But in 
early 1800, the post-Napoleonic Wars economic crisis and the decline of world trade 
reduced Norway’s fleet by a quarter (Andersen and Collett, 1989). After the Napoleonic 
Wars, Norwegian shipping concentrated on traditional and well-established freight and 
markets, carrying Norwegian exports – lumber, fish and iron – from Norwegian to foreign 
ports.  However, a great expansion of the Norwegian fleet came later in the 1850s, and was 
closely linked to free trade. In 1849, the British Parliament ended its Navigation Act, 
which had restricted foreign shipping in British ports. This change provided new 
opportunities for Norwegian fleets to carry cargoes between third countries. The 
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Navigation Acts were a series of acts of Parliament that were passed beginning in 1381 
to protect English shipping from foreign competition and to ensure monopoly trading 
between Britain and its colonies (Svendsen, 1999; Pape, 2003). The Navigation Act of 
1381 remained virtually a dead letter because of shortage of ships. The first of what is 
called “The famous Navigation Acts” were passed in 1651 (Encyclopedia Britannica 
Concise, 2007). 
 
From 1850 to 1880 the Norwegian merchant fleet increased substantially; measured in 
tonnes, the fleet increased five times over the period, to become third among shipping 
nations as measured in net registered tonnes (Andersen and Collett, 1989). The fleet then 
entered a period of slower growth, until a new acceleration period around the First World 
War.  During the interwar period, Norway acquired a modern fleet of tankers and changed 
from steam to diesel as a means of propulsion. At the end of the 1930s, 60% of the total 
fleet consisted of motor ships, a higher proportion than in any other country.  
 
After 1945 came 30 years of continuous growth, but a crisis in the economy in the 
1970s resulted in a crash in the oil market, and half the tanker fleet was laid up. As a 
result of the economic crisis in the 1970s and high costs in the early 1980s, many ship 
owners registered their ships abroad. To revitalise Norwegian shipping, the Norwegian 
Parliament passed the Norwegian International Ship Register (NIS) Act in 1987. In 
1990 Norway's merchant fleet was once again the third largest in the world as measured 
by country of owner, a position it still holds today. As of  January 1, 2005, the 
Norwegian foreign-going fleet was comprised of 1,614 ships employing some 62,000 
people of more than 60 different nationalities aboard ships and rigs. In addition, almost 
11,000 were employed onshore. More than 90 per cent of the Norwegian merchant fleet 
never calls at a Norwegian port, but conducts cross-trade between third countries 
(Norwegian Ship-owners Association, 2007). 
 
2.2 Seafaring on Norwegian vessels - a high-risk occupation 
 
Statistics for Norwegian sailing ships showed that casualties for Norwegian ships as a 
percentage of the world’s fleet was on average 6% yearly from 1890 to 1910, which is twice 
as high as the world’s fleet excluding the Norwegians. 
  21
The year 1894 was an “annus horribilis” in Norwegian sea transport when as many as 308 
sailing ships and 15 steamships sank, and a total of 567 people lost their lives as a result 
(Fig.2.1).  
 
 
Figure 2.1 Ship losses 1850-1999 (Source: National Bureau of Statistics) 
http://www.ssb.no/emner/historisk_statistikk/artikler/art-2000-11-01-01.html  
 
 
In fact, 1894 was an exceptional year, but in 11 out of the 20 years from 1874 to 1894, more 
than 200 lost lives were registered as a result of vessels sinking. However, capsizing and 
sinking was only one of many risks for seafarers; only 27% of the deaths during the period 
resulted from vessels sinking. Nearly as many (22%) were killed as a result of accidents 
aboard and 51% died because of disease (Statistical Yearbook, 2000) showing that the 
many deaths was an occupational health and safety problem. 
 
The Norwegian merchant marine was in poor condition, but not all losses were fatal for the 
crew. Of the 198 wooden sailing ships that were lost in 1895, 94 ran aground, 48 were 
abandoned by the crew, 28 were condemned because of their bad condition, and 14 were 
lost at sea. Explanations for the loss of ships and life included poor quality ships, 
incompetence of masters and crew, drunkenness, moral hazards associated with marine 
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insurance, poor charts, poor harbours, the carrying of deck loads and strong currents and ice 
including icebergs in the North Atlantic (Sjostrom, 2000).  According to “Anchor and 
Balance”, Det Norske Veritas (DnV) history from 1864 to 1989 the slow transition from sail 
to steam was the main reason. The numerous accidents happened because the low-cost 
sailing fleet posed a serious safety problem. In 1890 only 16% of the Norwegian fleet 
consisted of steamers, compared to 60% in the German fleet and 75% in the British fleet 
(Andersen and Collett, 1989).  
 
Safety problems at sea consequently became a major public concern, and as early as 1877, 
Henrik Ibsen published Pillars of Society, with a plot that centred on a shipbuilder 
deliberately operating an unseaworthy ship. The background for Ibsen’s play was Samuel 
Plimsolls book Our Seamen from 1872, where he pointed out the unacceptably high number 
of sailors who were lost with unseaworthy ships. Plimsoll called special attention to the 
problems from overloaded ships and demanded a load line to mark the minimum freeboard 
allowed with full loading (now known as the Plimsoll line).   As a result of this, 
parliamentary members (notably Christian Michelsen and Gunnar Knutsen, later prime 
ministers) were active participants in discussions on safety at sea and chaired the committee 
and commission that led to the Act of Seaworthiness, which was put into force in 1906. The 
act established the Maritime Office as a public control body responsible for controlling and 
surveying the seaworthiness of merchant ships. 
 
Fishermen also had an extremely high the accident rate. Eilert Sundt (1971/1858) 
documented the problem in his book Harham, which is about a fishing community outside 
of Ålesund: 
“This community of just 1866 souls lost 117 people to the sea over 37 years (more than 3 
each year). This is more than twice of what it would be if the conditions in this community 
were the same as elsewhere in Norway, and Norway may be the country in Europe where 
these matters are most tragic” (Eilert Sundt, 1971/1858 p. 52).  
 
 
 Two periods with extensive losses of ships and crew were the First and Second World 
Wars (Fig. 2.1). In spite of being neutral during the First World War, Norway experienced 
some of the heaviest losses of all merchant fleets during the war years 1914 to 1918; the 
total loss was 2,000 seafarers and half the fleet. The shipping industry was accused by some 
of sending sailors to their death in World War I. Bjørnstjerne Bjørnson’s 1868 title “Our 
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Honour and Glory has white sails us brought” was used by Nordal Grieg (1952) as the 
basis for a play called “Our Honour and Glory,” which shows the garish contrast between 
seafarers and ship owners from 1917 to 1935, and describes cynical ship owners and agents 
gambling with sailors’ lives, while they themselves earned good money and lived a life of 
luxury. When after the war, the sailor remains an alcoholic, living as a nervous wreck in a 
cheap hostel, the ship owners continued their hedonistic existence.   
 
Following the German invasion in 1940, the Norwegian government exiled in London 
requisitioned almost the entire merchant fleet. Norwegian seafarers sailed in the service of 
the Allies and 3,400 of them died, and nearly three-fifths of the fleet was lost.  
 
National statistics (Statistical Yearbook, 2000) show a clear trend in the risks posed by 
seafaring from the late 19th century to the present day, from more than 100 vessels and 
around 200 lost lives each year in the 1890s, to on average eight Norwegian vessels and 
14 lost lives from 1990 to 1998 (Fig 2.1). The positive trend seems to continue and 
statistics from 2000 to 2005 shows on average seven Norwegian vessels totally lost and 
4.5 lost lives (Statistical Yearbook, 2006).   
 
2.3 The context of maritime safety  
 
At the beginning of the 20th century, it was possible to build a ship more or less whichever 
way one liked, and to equip it with whatever instruments one liked, operate it according to 
whatever standards one liked, and sail it whatever way one liked on any ocean.  Only a few 
common navigational rules had emerged. In 1879, nineteen nations adopted joint rules in 
London for an international signal code; in 1880 an international convention set the first 
rules for preventing collisions, and in 1881 the first convention on health and safety for 
steam packet navigation was signed. 
 
Accidents and major disasters encouraged nations to cooperate in the search for safe, 
efficient maritime transport.  It was realised that only an agreement among nations that 
established minimum standards to be met by a particular ship performing a particular 
service could offer a satisfactory long-term solution to safety. One example is freeboard 
legislation.  Two identical vessels, but of different nationalities, might compete on the same 
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route.  If one of them was more heavily loaded than the other, one ship owner would earn a 
higher profit than the other, but would also expose his ship to greater dangers, and a 
correspondingly lower level of safety.  If the same freeboard was displayed on the hulls of 
both ships by a loadline, overloading would no longer be an acceptable commercial tactic.  
Several international organisations, such as the Comité Maritime International (CMI) and 
the International Labour Organisation (ILO) tried to harmonise national safety rules. This 
move towards internationalisation of the law took place in several stages.  First, the local 
regulations were made uniform through bilateral treaties, agreements or understandings 
among the leading maritime nations.  Next, these same nations held international 
conferences, in order to set up genuinely universal rules.  Finally, intergovernmental 
organisations took over and encouraged the adoption of international instruments to 
regulate safety at sea and protection of the marine environment. 
 
After the Second World War, international conferences on safety at sea were held. In 1947 
the Oslo Convention introduced a new registered tonnage system and in 1948, the British 
government invited all nations that had signed the SOLAS Convention to attend an 
international conference, in order to revise the provisions on safety of life at sea.  A new 
version was adopted in June by twenty-seven nations, which came into effect on 19 
November 1952. 
 
IMO International Maritime Organisation 
In 1948, a convention was signed in Geneva to establish the International Maritime 
Consultative Organisation (IMCO), which was designed to assume responsibility for safety 
issues at sea; its name was changed in 1982 to the International Maritime Organisation 
(IMO). The IMO is the most important international organisation dealing with safety issues 
at sea. 
The present purposes of IMO as summarized by Article 1 (a) of the Convention are: 
 "to provide machinery for co- operation among Governments in the field of governmental 
regulation and practices relating to technical matters of all kinds affecting shipping 
engaged in international trade; to encourage and facilitate the general adoption of the 
highest practicable standards in matters concerning maritime safety, efficiency of 
navigation and prevention and control of marine pollution from ships."  
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Several international regulations have been agreed under the IMO framework (or pre-IMO 
framework) focusing on safety at sea. The first of these was the Safety of Life at Sea 
(SOLAS) Convention, which in its successive forms has generally been regarded as the 
most important of all international treaties concerning the safety of merchant ships. The first 
version was adopted in 1914, in response to the sinking of the Titanic. The first 
International Convention on Load Lines (LL), adopted in 1930, was based on the principle 
of reserve buoyancy, although it was recognised then that the freeboard should also ensure 
adequate stability and avoid excessive stress on the ship's hull as a result of overloading. 
The Torrey Canyon disaster of 1967, in which 120,000 tonnes of oil were spilled, led to the 
International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships (MARPOL). It covers 
not only accidental and operational oil pollution but also pollution from chemicals, goods in 
packaged form, sewage, garbage and air pollution. The International Convention on 
Standards of Training, Certification and Watchkeeping for Seafarers, 1978 (STCW), 
was the first to establish basic requirements at an international level for training, 
certification and watch keeping for seafarers. Previously, individual governments 
established standards for training, certification and watch keeping for officers and 
ratings, usually without reference to practices in other countries.  
 
A number of very serious accidents occurred during the late 1980s identified 
management as an important contributing factor. The IMO adopted the International 
Management Code for the Safe Operation of Ships and for Pollution Prevention (the ISM 
Code) in 1993. In 1998, the ISM Code became mandatory. The Code establishes safety 
management objectives and requires a safety management system (SMS) to be established 
by "the Company". The Company is then required to establish and implement a policy for 
achieving these objectives. This includes providing the necessary resources and shore-based 
support. Every company is expected "to designate a person or persons ashore having direct 
access to the highest level of management". The procedures required by the Code are to be 
documented and compiled in a Safety Management Manual, a copy of which must be kept 
on board. The last but not least important step towards safer seas is the Port State Control 
(PSC). PSC is a ship inspection program whereby foreign vessels entering a sovereign 
state’s waters are boarded and inspected to ensure compliance with various major 
international maritime conventions, such as SOLAS, MARPOL, STCW, LL, as well as the 
Convention on the International Regulations for Preventing Collisions at Sea (COLREG) 
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and the International Labour Organization Convention No. 147 Merchant Shipping 
(Minimum Standards) (ILO 147).  
 
All in all, the focus on safety at sea has shifted from the technical arena to the 
organisational and human factor arena and from a single factor to multiple factors 
contributing to accidents. The Secretary-General of the IMO, Mr. William A. O'Neil, in 
connection with the World Maritime Day in 2002, stated it this way: 
“However, it has also been recognized that the one area to which most accidents have been 
attributed - namely the human factor - while not being totally neglected in the past, was in 
need of greater attention. Therefore, the theme selected for World Maritime Day this year 
reflects the importance and advantages of creating a genuine safety culture in the people 
involved in all components of the shipping industry.”  
 
Regulatory changes introduced by the IMO take between 5 and 10 years to implement. 
One conclusion regarding the development of international maritime regulations is that 
the international maritime regulations regime seems reactive at best, since many of the 
regulations are result of major disasters, not strategic choices by the IMO.  However, by 
introducing ISM, PSC and voyage data recorders in recent years, the IMO seems to 
have moved towards becoming more proactive.  
 
Classification societies 
Due to the undesirable state of affairs in shipping safety during the 17th and 18th 
centuries, the first 'classification societies' were founded to be a neutral assessor of the 
seaworthiness of vessels. The classification societies were established to develop and 
monitor standards of design, construction and maintenance of ships and thereby help 
insurers in underwriting risks. The first classification society was Lloyd's Register (17th 
century). Today there are more than 50 marine classification organisations worldwide, 
with the "big three" being Lloyd's Register, Det Norske Veritas and the American 
Bureau of Shipping. 
 
Ship owners seek to have their vessels classified so as to satisfy marine insurers, who 
require that ships in fact be “classed” before underwriting the risks. However, the 
International Union of Marine Insurers (IUMI) has criticised what it sees as a “conflict 
of interest” in the classification system. They question the fact that ship owners employ 
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classification societies to provide them with classification certificates while, at the same 
time, the owners could be required by the societies to spend money to enhance the 
safety of their ships. This may tempt ship owners to employ classification societies that 
don’t require costly safety improvements, and IUMI has argued that the prospect of 
losing a client might “encourage” a society to lower its standards. After the loss of 25 
bulk carriers in 1990 and 1991, insurance companies in the UK allowed 'The Salvage 
Association' inspect a sample of bulk carriers. The statistics published in September, 
1993 revealed that some 80% of the 200 classed ships surveyed required extensive 
repairs. 
 
Marine insurance 
Marine insurance is generally considered to have been the very first type of insurance. 
The oldest tangible evidence of this insurance is a policy written in 1343. In a different 
form, however, marine insurance can be traced back to the bottomry bonds and 
respondentia bonds used in ancient Greece and Rome and, even further back, to the 
relationship between Babylonian traders and their darmathas. By the 17th century, 
marine insurance was being transacted by individual underwriters who congregated in 
London coffeehouses, most notably Edward Lloyd’s coffeehouse, which was the 
predecessor to the modern Lloyd’s of London. 
 
Presently, however, the competitive marine insurance market has resulted in fewer ships 
being surveyed by insurers. It appears that some insurers are willing to take insurance 
risks “at face value” due to the difficult market conditions, but it is absolutely vital that 
the underwriter knows the background details and knows if the ship owner is trying to 
do something to improve matters. 
A problem for safety that has been raised by insurers in recent decades is  the “trend” to 
agree to unrealistically high vessel values for insurance purposes, which may tempt ship 
owners to “allow” their vessels to be lost, as an escape route out of financial difficulties. 
Marine insurers rely on the certificates provided by classification societies when issuing 
coverage for vessels. Such certificates permit an insurer to make a reasonable 
assumption as to the state of a vessel and its risk, before insuring the vessel.  
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As a result, it appears that competition among insurance companies and among 
classification companies may lead to less focus on imposing safety measures on vessels 
and ship owners. 
2.4 Safety culture/climate studies at sea 
 
As described earlier in the thesis Sten and Fjerdingen (2003) concluded that no research had 
been done on maritime safety culture: 
“We have not found any papers reporting research on safety culture aboard ships. It is 
known that Norway has used identical CRM training (Crew Resource Management) for 
crews on ships and crews on aeroplanes, but this has not identified by scientific 
publications” Sten and Fjerdingen, 2003, p. 22).   
 
 
In recent years, however, a few papers, reports and PhD theses on maritime safety 
culture/climate have been published. Heterington et al. (2006) reviewed 20 studies of 
seafaring that concerned fatigue, stress, health, situation awareness, teamwork, decision-
making, communication, automation, and safety culture. The paper concluded that 
monitoring and modifying human factors could contribute to maritime safety 
performance. Ek (2006) investigated safety culture at sea and in aviation transport for her 
doctoral thesis (Lund University) and concluded that air traffic control showed a better 
learning process than passenger shipping, and was characterised by a more mature approach 
for reporting anomalies and by having better procedures for analysing limitations and 
implementing improvements. Two NTNU doctoral theses touching on safety culture in a 
maritime setting have also been published in recent years (Soma, 2005; Hansson, 2006). 
Soma (2005) found that safety is a quality of the ship owner rather than the vessel, and that 
accidents do not happen -- they are “made”. Hansson (2006) documented and developed a 
methodology called the SMO methodology (safety management for prevention of 
occupational accidents) with the objective of proposing safety measures for the prevention 
of accidents. An action research approach was used in an operational setting in the offshore 
supply services in Statoil. This approach was reported to give good results. Hansson’s PhD 
research was done on a project at Studio Apertura, which is an interdisciplinary research 
group at NTNU that is currently conducting research projects with the aim of improving 
safety on oil rigs and vessels sailing for Statoil.  In his PhD (University of Tasmania), Shea 
(2005) investigated the effect of organisational culture on accidents and seafaring 
leadership. Shea (2005) found that head of departments displayed two distinct behavioural 
characteristics when they work aboard ships. The first behaviour type was positive and 
demonstrated support towards subordinates, the other showed indifference towards 
subordinates and their activities. When the head of a department displayed the latter 
behaviour, the study indicated a negative impact on the safety climate of a ship. The study 
also showed a linkage between the organisational culture aboard ships and marine accidents.      
 
An industry with a resemblance to shipping is offshore oil exploration and production. By 
searching in the Science Direct Database (Elsevier), two papers dealing with safety climate 
/culture in shipping were found, as compared to seven dealing with safety climate/culture in 
the offshore oil industry. By searching the database for safety in shipping and safety 
offshore, 74 and 204 papers were found, respectively. Far more papers are published on 
safety culture and climate in offshore oil production and exploration than in shipping (e.g. 
Adie et al. 2005; Mearns et al. 2002; O’Dea and Flin, 2001; Cox and Cheyne, 2000), 
indicating a stronger focus on safety in that industry. One can speculate about the 
difference; one reason might be that offshore oil exploration is a young and profitable 
industry, with powerful players and a lot of political interest paired with spectacular 
accidents such as the capsize of the Alexander Kielland, a floating accommodation unit 
in which 123 people died in 1980; and in 1988 both the Piper Alpha disaster, in which 
167 people died, and the Ocean Odyssey accident, in which 45 people died. These kinds 
of dramatic accidents might very well lead to a willingness to finance research on 
offshore oil safety in the North Sea.    
  
Two “competing” theories that have both used examples from seafaring are the theory 
of High Reliability Organisations and Normal Accident Theory. The theory of High 
Reliability Organisations (Weick, 1987; LaPorte and Consolini, 1991; Roberts 1993) is 
based on the belief that accidents can be prevented through good organisational design 
and management. Normal Accident Theory clams that it is impossible to prevent severe 
accidents in sufficiently complex system (Perrow, 1984/1999). In his book, Perrow used 
examples from marine, nuclear, dams and aircraft as examples of industries with 
complex systems that made accidents unavoidable.  High reliability organisations are 
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the prime examples of the system approach. Safety is the primary organisational 
objective for High Reliability Organisations. Redundancies, simulations, a strict 
organisational structure, decentralised decision-making, learning from mistakes, 
mindfulness, good training, and experienced personnel are seen as important requisites 
for being are highly reliable organisation. Managers anticipate the worst and equip 
themselves to deal with it at all levels of the organisation. For these organisations, the 
pursuit of safety is about making the system as robust as is practicable. By conducting 
research on U.S. Naval battleships, Roberts (1993) and her colleagues found that 
reliable groups requires that all system members cooperate and openly share 
communication, reduce status differentials at sea, and let people with the salient 
information and training make decisions; when those factors are in place, then accidents 
can be avoided.  
According to Normal Accident theory does Perrow claim that large accidents always 
will happens no matter what you do: “Accidents are inevitable and happens all the time, 
serious ones are inevitable though infrequent; catastrophes are inevitable but 
extremely rare” Perrow (1999:71). Roberts (1989) define high reliability organizations 
as” Hazardous organizations that engage in nearly error free operations” .Sagan (1993) 
differentiate Normal Accident Theory as pessimistic and High Reliability Theory as 
optimistic and from my point of view the two theories seem to agree, they just looks at 
the same problem from different viewpoints. Just look at the definitions above: Is the 
bottle half-full or half-empty? 
 
As the only international body responsible for making rules and setting universal maritime 
safety standards, IMO’s handling of research on safety and safety culture might be of 
interest. In recent years, the IMO has promoted discussion of, and has written about, safety 
culture (www.imo.org), but the organisation does not appear to have conducted any substantial 
research activities on the issue.  
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3 Theoretical framework 
 
The theoretical framework described in this chapter is broad and will cover several aspects 
and theories that influence safety orientation. Many authors have focused on the broadness 
and complexity of safety culture to illustrate the fact that it does not operate in a vacuum 
but affects, and in turn is affected by, other non-safety related operational processes or 
organisational systems. 
Hale and Hovden (1998) described the broadness and change in “paradigms” with respect 
to how to interpret and manage safety problems, moving from technical paradigms, through 
human to management, organisations and culture paradigms. Reason (1993) recognised 
that personal, situational and behavioural factors are the immediate precursors of unsafe 
acts. Rasmussen’s (1997) model “Risk management in a dynamic society” showed that 
safety includes many research disciplines and theories, including political science, 
economics, sociology, law, decision theory, organisational theory, psychology, human 
factors, man–machine interactions and mechanical and electrical engineering. Cooper 
(2000) said that to a greater or lesser degree, accident causation models recognise the 
presence of an interactive or reciprocal relationship among psychological, situational 
and behavioural factors. He also focused on the influence of contextual factors on safety 
culture.  
 
3.1 Organisational climate and culture 
 
The constructs of organisational climate and culture have been subject to discussions 
concerning definition, content and unit theory measurement analysis. The methodologies 
used to study these concepts have generally distinguished between organisational climate 
and organisational culture. Climate has usually been assessed using quantitative methods, 
while culture is generally examined with qualitative methods (Glick, 1985). Paper 1 
discusses further whether organisational climate and organisational culture are the same and 
found no clear advice to give; some papers use the terms alternately and others describe 
them as two distinct constructs, however,  I have chosen to treat them as one construct in 
my papers.  
Both Schein (1985) and Bolman and Deal (1991) suggest that the values and norms of an 
organisation are important when it comes to setting priorities and establishing behaviour. In 
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other words, if an organisation has established a safety culture, either good or bad, new 
members of the organisation will be socialized into it.  
The interest in organisational culture during the 1980s and 1990s stems from four different 
sources: climate research, national cultures, human resource management and from the 
conviction that approaches that emphasise the rational and structural nature of organisations 
cannot offer a full explanation for organisational behaviour (Brown, 1995).  
 
Schein is probably the most significant scholar in this approach, which looks at culture as 
an integrative mechanism, like the “social glue” between its members (Schein, 1992). 
Common values and assumptions are the consistent shared element. Other representatives 
of the integration perspective link the approach to managerial prerogatives, and attempts to 
implement top-down control and change of culture (Peters and Waterman, 1982; Deal and 
Kennedy, 1982; Hofstede 1991). From this perspective, one culture is seen as the dominant 
one, whereas others are represented as sub-cultures. Schein’s (1985) definition of 
organisational culture is the one that seems to be most widely accepted and most referenced 
in the academic literature:  
“Organizational culture is a pattern of basic assumptions - invented, discovered, or 
developed by a given group as it learns to cope with its problems of external adaptation and 
internal integration - that has worked well enough to be considered valid and, therefore, to 
be taught to new members as the correct way to perceive, think, and feel in relation to those 
problems (Schein, 1985).” 
 
Schein (1999) also describes culture as found at every hierarchical level in an organisation, 
where an organisational unit has a common occupational core and common experience.  
Rasmussen (1997) suggests that the most important unit of analysis might be the "business 
unit" or the organisation, but in larger organisations the business unit seems to be 
appropriate rather than the company. This because the company might be safety oriented to 
different degrees, depending upon sub-cultures in different departments or on different 
ships. Subcultures form based on factors such as age, nationality, education, job task, 
profession, etc. (Parker, 2000; Alvesson, 2002; Schein 2004, Reiman, 2007). The existence 
of subcultures can be considered an indication of a weak organisational culture (Brown, 
1995). On the other hand, a strong culture can counteract questioning and independent 
thinking, which can prevent people from acting or considering alternatives in unforeseen 
and critical situations. This in turn can lead to less safety (Reiman, 2007; Sagan, 1993; 
Weick, 1998).  
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3.2 National culture 
 
Does one’s national culture affect one’s work and behaviour? Geert Hofstede’s study (1991, 
2001) shows value differences between national cultures. Do these differences have an 
effect on safety?  Helmreich and Merrit (1998) replicated Hofstede’s study to determine to 
what extent Hofstede’s dimensions were relevant to safety in 9000 male commercial airline 
pilots in eighteen countries. They concluded that national culture should be added to the list 
of influences on a pilot’s approach to work. Particularly in situations where the national 
values and the organisational values were in conflict, the risk increased because the conflict 
could lead to stress.  
 
In Paper 5 statistically significant differences between nationalities (10 countries) and most 
factors in the safety culture questionnaire (N=2558) is found. This research also indicated 
that the number of nationalities on a vessel could influence safety. It showed that a single-
nation crew and a crew from more than two nations would result in a more positive attitude 
toward safety than a crew from two nations. A possible explanation for this was that if the 
crew hailed from a single nation or was multinational there could never be a majority and 
minority, while if the crew hailed from two nationalities, attitudes, values and norms might 
come into conflict and lead to stress. 
 
 Douglas and Wildavsky (1983) recognised that modern attitudes towards risk had many 
causes, but they believed the dominant factor remained cultural. The things we choose to 
fear reflect our values more than our knowledge of actual risks. We choose to fear those 
things that convince us that our deeply held prejudices are valid. For example, a young man 
from a West African culture explained that he did not wear a motorcycle helmet as he had 
consulted the traditional priest and knew he was in no danger (Dixey, 1999).  
 
Lamvik (2002) wrote his PhD thesis about Filipino seafarers sailing on Norwegian vessels. 
He has since conducted research on national cultures and safe work practice (Lamvik and 
Ravn, 2006; Lamvik and Bye, 2004) and has concluded that national culture is an important 
factor to consider in safety culture.     
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3.3 Professional culture 
 
Professional culture reflects the attitudes and values associated with an occupation (DeWitte 
and Muijhen, 1999; Brown, 1995; Merritt, 1997). Professions are characterised by their 
members’ expertise and create a form of thinking. Professionals can deliver services that the 
lay person cannot (Hughes, 1958). The process of acquiring expertise usually requires the 
novice to undergo a long training process. Professions typically employ symbols that 
differentiate them from lay persons (Greenwood, 1957). The norms and values of a 
profession are exemplified by its senior members and passed on to recruits (socialisation). 
Members of a strong professional culture are typically proud of their membership and place 
great value on their work. Strong professional cultures might have both positive and 
negative aspects. Dedication to the job and good safety behaviour under extreme situations 
might have saved many lives but employees who have unrealistic attitudes about their 
personal capabilities and invulnerability might be a danger to themselves and others.   
 
 
3.4 Industry culture 
 
 All industries have some characteristics that are related to the industry they work in. Let us 
use the shipping industry as an example: The technology and environment are relatively 
similar for all ships (compared to other industries), and technical standards are similar 
within the industry because of requirements from the IMO and inspections by classification 
societies. The expertise demanded by the industry is the same for all ships, and is 
guaranteed through certificates and international schools.  
 
Bourrier (1998, 1999) compared practices in four nuclear maintenance units in France and 
the USA. She noted differences between the units and found that each plant had its own 
official or unofficial way of following procedures. A newer study that confirmed these 
findings is Reiman (2007), who studied safety management from a cultural perspective in 
nuclear power plant maintenance organisations in Finland. One could expect that a “High 
Reliability Organization HRO” industry such as nuclear power production had many 
common procedures and routines that focused on safety. Reiman found that the industry 
culture showed a fragmented picture of the challenges of safe and effective maintenance. 
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Only technicians formed an occupational subgroup that potentially shared some 
characteristics across domains.      
Schein (1985) suggests a variety of strategies for culture change. In one strategy, leaders are 
imported from another culture in the hope that they will place their stamp on the 
organisation through coercively mandating behavioural changes. For example, nuclear 
power plants that have trouble with regulators might hire Navy admirals into senior 
management positions on the assumption that the Navy has an effective and disciplined way 
of doing things and the admiral will be able to make the plant more Navy-like (O’Reilly and 
Chatman, 1996). However, the research literature suggests that such a culture is successful 
only if the new leader gains credibility with the employees and mandates changes that make 
some sense in the present culture (Dyer, 1986). Carroll and Quijada (2004) ask if it makes 
sense for hospitals to hire from the Navy or the airlines? Could such people function 
effectively in the culture of health care? Do they have the necessary technical knowledge 
and familiarity with the work? Or should the health care industry cannibalise other health 
care organisations that are considered progressive and successful by hiring away their 
leaders? 
Individuals are member of many groups and many “cultures”. The same person can be 
member of a work group, a department, an organisation, an industry, a profession, a 
nation and a family. The cultures discussed above are embedded in each other, and 
when the roles / expectations of the different cultures clash this might lead to stress and 
influence occupational health and safety. When differences surface in organisations, or 
communities, culture is always present, shaping perceptions, attitudes, behaviours, and 
outcomes.  
 
 
3.5 Learning culture 
 
According to Reason (1997), the learning culture is probably the easiest culture to engineer 
but the most difficult to make work. Some scholars of organisational learning, such as 
Schein (1985), Senge (1990) and Argyris and Schön (1996), offer prescriptions that are 
useful at least as guides as to the kind of organisational structures, processes, and conditions 
that may function as enablers of productive organisational learning.  
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A learning organisation continuously improves safety because it is determined to learn from 
information and has a willingness to change and adopt improvements; in other words, it 
promotes proactive integration of safety into organisational structures and processes.  
Peter Senge (1990) observes: “Learning disabilities are tragic in children, but they are fatal 
in organizations. Because of them, few corporations live even half as long as the person – 
most die before they reach the age of forty.”  
 
Pidgeon and O'Leary (2000) underscore the importance of organisational learning in safety 
work: "What is common to many accounts, however, is the emphasis upon organizational 
learning as a key component of appropriate safety cultures and organizational designs" 
(Pidgeon and O’Leary, 2000, p.19). According to Pidgeon and O'Leary (2000), the two 
main barriers to organisational learning are information difficulties (e.g. the 1986 
Challenger shuttle disaster) and blame, organisational politics and cover-up (e.g. the 1984 
Bhopal chemical disaster).  
 
A problem with working with organisational learning as a factor in safety orientation is the 
lack of explicit definitions and tools with which to measure the construct (Gallagher and 
Fellenz, 1999).  
 
 
3.6 Safety climate and culture 
 
Cox and Flin (1998) discuss safety culture under the heading “nature and measurement of 
organisational culture for safety”, suggesting that they perceive safety culture to be a subset 
of organisational culture.  
 
The concepts of safety climate and culture are subject to an ongoing discussion that is 
similar to the discussion of organisational climate and culture (Bang, 1995). 
Many approaches and definitions have been offered (Guldenmund, 2000). Zohar (2000) 
considers safety climate as a primary culture, particularly with reference to management 
priorities, while others have adopted a wider definition that includes more multilevel 
content (Cheyneet al., 1998; Flin et al., 2000; Guldenmund, 2000). Several studies have 
been devoted to understanding which variables are related to or determine the occurrence of 
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accidents and unsafe behaviour. Much attention has been paid to personal characteristics 
such as educational level and gender, which have been proposed as significant predictors of 
accidents (Ferguson et al, 1984; Leigh, 1986). Cognitive factors such as perception of risk, 
and/or attitudes towards safety have also been forwarded as important in motivation and 
behaviour. Within this framework, the workers’ perception of management’s attitudes and 
actions has a direct and indirect effect on behaviour (Drever, 1995; Coyle et al, 1995).  Lee 
and Harrison found that almost all 28 safety-culture/-climate factors from a factor analysis 
reached acceptable levels of statistical significance for one or more accident criteria used 
(Lee and Harrison, 2000). A survey among oil workers in the North Sea found associations 
between several safety climate scales and accidents as measured by official statistics in the 
previous 12 months (Mearns et al., 2000). 
 
This thesis addresses safety climate and culture as one construct (Håvold, 2005a).  
 
 
3.7 Accident models 
 
Accident models form the basis for investigation and analysing accidents and as such, have 
been found to influence the prevention of new accidents. Kjellen (2000) maintains that it is 
important for people using risk and accident information in decision-making to share their 
frame of reference. Accident models can establish a shared understanding of how and why 
accidents happen, which in turn makes communication, goal-setting and decision-making 
easier. Accident models are simplified representations of what is happening in real life. 
Each accident model has characteristic causal factors it represents, and therefore, no 
single best model of accident causation exists. Many models might reflect either the 
professional bias of the author or a particular type of accident or control measure.  
 
There have been numerous attempts to "model" the accident process. These models 
range from the extremely simple, with a focus on direct causes, to the extremely complex, 
with a focus on the systems safety, such as "MORT" the Management Oversight Risk Tree 
(Johnson, 1980). 
 
Heinrich’s 1931 book “Industrial Accident Prevention – A Scientific Approach” was the 
first comprehensive book on industrial accident prevention and was considered the “bible” 
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for many who worked with accident prevention. Heinrich’s book presented his “iceberg 
theory”, using a ratio of one accident, 29 near accidents and 300 dangerous situations. 
Heinrich’s “iceberg theory” has been much criticised; however, much of the criticism might 
be based on the misunderstanding that that the cause of the different accident categories in 
the model were the same. Heinrich made no such claims; on the contrary, he warned about 
such misunderstandings. Research shows that a company or group can have a Lost Time 
Injury rate (LTI) close to zero, but can still have a large risk of severe accidents or a bad 
work environment (Hovden, 2001).  
 
Accident models and the theories behind them have been structured using different 
perspectives: Hollnagel (2004) structured accident models from the perspective of 
“complexity” and Leveson (2004) from the perspective of “engineering”.  
 
Hale and Hovden (1998) structured accident models from the perspective of “time”, 
identifying three stages of development in safety management. The “first age” focuses 
mainly on legislation and technical actions, because safety is mainly looked at as a technical 
problem. The human factor was added gradually during the 1960s and 1970s, leading to the 
“second age” of safety management. The “third age” evolved as a result of work done 
amongst others from the Advisory Committee on Safety in the Nuclear Industry (ACSNI, 
1993) and focused directly on the structure and functioning of management. 
The author built on Hale and Hovden’s structure of accident models and introduced a five 
stage time perspective on the development of accidents and risk theories (Table 3.1).  
Each stage relies on different remedial actions based on the causes attributed to the 
accidents; the author also explains why safety culture and safety orientation are of interest 
when creating a ‘toolbox’ for organisations wanting to improve safety. However, old 
accident models and remedies seem to have survived in parallel with models based on 
scientific research, even if the weight and focus has changed over the years.  
 
Table 3.1 Five stages in the development of accident attribution and remedial actions 
Stage Accidents attributed to: Remedial action: regulation regimes 
5 Cultural; since the 1980s Safety orientation, improving culture; training 
4 Managerial, system faults; 
since the 1970s 
ISM-code; ISO 9000, ISO 14000 
3 Individual fault; since the 1910s Disciplinary measures, dismissing workers 
2 Technical faults; since the 1800s Certification, design changes and improvements 
1 Fate; since man evolved  Nothing anyone can do about it 
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In stage one, accidents are attributed to fate, “An act of God”, or that things just happen and 
there is not much anyone can do about it. Fate is still a major explanatory factor for many 
people (Hovden and Larson, 1987; Douglas and Widlavsky, 1982) and the degree of 
fatalism differs between groups of people and between nationalities.  
 
Stage two focuses on technical faults. The rating of technical quality of vessels was 
overseen by classification societies. A society like Lloyds was founded as early as 1760 “to 
examine merchant ships and 'classify' them according to their condition”, while DnV was 
founded in 1864.   
 
 In stage three the accident-prone person was commonly accepted as an accident theory and 
the accident risk might be reduced substantially by removing the accident-prone person 
from hazardous jobs. Human errors were focused on. A human error occurs when human 
actions transgress some norms or limits of what is planned/intended, or what is normal or 
acceptable. Authors claimed that from 60 to 90% of all accidents were primarily caused by 
dangerous acts of the worker (Heinrich, 1931; Perrow, 1999; Kjellen, 2000). The remaining 
was either “Acts of God” or due to technical failures.  
 
Stage four focused on organisational safety and complex systems. This approach was 
adopted by Vaughan (1997) when she analyzed the Challenger accident and by Perrow 
(1984/1999) in his book Normal Accidents. Perrow (1984/1999) identified a social 
component of technological risk and accidents and argued that systems fail because of 
extensive complexity and that the engineering approaches that employ warnings and 
safeguards are not sufficient to prevent accidents.  
 
In stage five, during the 1990s, an interest in safety culture and safety climate exploded and 
many international organisations like the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), 
IMO, and International Air Transport Association (IATA) started to employ the concept of 
safety culture in their discussions and communications, and as explanatory factors for 
accidents and near accidents. In the late 1990s and in 2000, the academic publication Safety 
Journals came out with special issues where safety culture was the focus, indicating that 
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safety culture was an interesting and useful addition to the safety debate (e.g. Work and 
Stress, Volume 12, Issue 3, 1998, and Safety Science Volume 34, Issues 1-3, 2000). 
  
Attribution theory is interesting in this context because the safety management process is 
influenced by the explanation given for the behaviour. The perceived causes of behaviour 
may actually influence judgments, actions and behaviour. If everyone in a society attributes 
accidents to an “Act of God”, there is not much that can be done to prevent accidents from 
happening. If a manager attributes an employee's poor safety performance to personal traits, 
he or she may be terminated. If the manager instead perceives that an employee's poor 
performance is due to a lack of knowledge, he may require the employee to undergo further 
training or provide more instruction or coaching. Attribution theory’s influence on safety 
work has been discussed by DeJoy (1985, 1994, and 2005) and LaCroix and DeJoy (1989).  
If causes of accidents are attributed to safety culture/safety orientation, as is done in this 
thesis, improving cultural factors and training are viable remedial actions. As such, 
measuring organisational culture and safety culture factors then becomes more interesting. 
 
 
3.8 Theories regarding attitude’s influence on behaviour 
 
Empirical studies suggesting a weak relationship between attitudes and behaviours first 
appeared in the 1930s, but have continued to appear in the literature (e.g. Kutner Wilkins 
and Yarrow, 1952).  Not much interest was shown to the empirical link between attitudes 
and behaviours except for some criticism by the sociologists Blumer (1955) and Wicker 
(1969) on the empirical weakness of the relations between the two elements. That 
inconsistency led to further research on attitude-behaviour relationships and several 
variations on attitude – behaviour models have been presented, amongst them Ajzen and 
Fishbein’s (1980) Theory of Reasoned Action and Fazio’s Attitude Behaviour Process 
Model (Fazio and Roskos-Ewoldsen, 1994).   
 
The dominant theory used in safety culture and climate literature to explain the link 
between attitudes and beliefs and behaviour are Ajzen and Fishbein’s (1980) Theory of 
Reasoned Action, which maintains that an individual’s intention is influenced by the 
previous attitude that they have toward the behaviour and the prevailing subjective norms 
(“the person's belief that specific individuals or groups think he should or should not 
perform the behaviour and his motivation to comply with the specific referents").  Most 
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people weigh the possible outcomes that could result from a decision that is being made.  
This model implies that the attitude a person has is their “positive or negative evaluation of 
performing the behaviour” (Fishbein 1967). The attitude that you hold toward the 
behaviour is affected by whether or not you think the act will lead to a favourable outcome.  
The theory of reasoned action (Ajzen and Fishbein, 1980) argues that behaviour can be 
predicted if an observer knows the person’s attitude to the particular behaviour, the person’s 
intention to perform the behaviour, what the person believes are the consequences of 
performing the behaviour, and the social norms that govern the behaviour. Aizen and 
Fishbein’s model and theory are referred to by several scientists who conduct safety 
research (e.g. Rundmo and Hale, 1999; Cox and Flin, 1998). 
 
An affirmation of the relationship between safety culture and safety performance can be 
found in research by many scientists, such as Zohar (1980), Glennon (1982) and Lee and 
Harrison (2000); however, in contrast, Glendon and Litherand (2001) failed to find any 
relationship between the two. 
 
There has been much discussion as to whether it is attitudes that influence behaviour or 
whether it is behaviour that influence attitudes (Festinger, 1957; Bem, 1967), or if attitudes 
and behaviour represent correlated co-effects of a process in which modification of one 
factor produces change in the other (Bandura, 1969). 
 
Risk homeostasis or risk compensation is a psychological theory developed by Gerald 
Wilde (1982). The theory of risk homeostasis states that an individual has a built-in target 
level of acceptable risk that does not change. This level varies among individuals. When the 
level of acceptable risks in one part of the individual's life changes, there will be a 
corresponding rise/drop in acceptable risk elsewhere. Wilde (1982) said that both theory 
and data indicated that safety- and lifestyle-dependent health are unlikely to improve unless 
the amount of risk people are willing to take is reduced.  Risk homeostasis theory claims 
that people at any moment in time compare the risk they perceive with their target level of 
risk and will adjust their behaviour in an attempt to eliminate any discrepancies between 
them (Wilde 1998).     
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3.9 Critique of the concept of safety culture 
 
In recent years there has been a great deal of interest in safety culture (Cheyne et al. 2002; 
Mearns et al., 2004; Sorensen, 2002; Glendon and Litherand 2001, Harvey et al., 2002; 
Guldenmund, 2000). Some authors believe that the cultural framework lacks a normative 
framework (Grote and Künzler, 2000; Lawrie et al., 2006). Analyses tend to involve 
descriptions of the norms and assumptions more or less shared by the members of the 
organisation and more or less supportive of fulfilling the organisation’s goals, but generally 
no conclusions about whether culture is “good” or “bad” can be drawn.  
Mats Alvesson (2001) describes culture as a tricky concept, because it can easily be used to 
cover everything and consequently nothing. That certain researchers are interested in 
“culture” – or at least use the term – does not mean that they have very much in common. 
Frequently, “culture” seems to refer to little more than a social pattern, e.g. it refers to 
surface phenomena rather than exploring the meanings and ideas behind them. It could 
therefore be advocated that in many cases the term should be abandoned in favour of 
something like “informal behavioural patterns”, “norm system” or simply “social pattern”. 
 
Sorensen (2002) also refers to the phenomenon’s many definitions and how the scope, 
depth, terminology and perspective vary from one study to the next: 
“The first source of difficulty is terminology. There is general agreement on the concept of 
safety culture, and some agreement on attributes. Many of the studies relating management 
and organizational factors to safety of operations do not use the term safety culture. If it is 
used, it may denote a narrowly defined element of a larger set of management and 
organization factors being investigated. One study can only be compared with another by 
looking at the organizational attributes that are actually measured. The study of safety 
culture might benefit substantially if a consensus were developed on its definition, and, most 
importantly, its measurable attributes (Sorensen, 2002, p.200).” 
 
In connection with a special issue on “safety culture” in Safety Science, editor Andrew Hale 
(2000) debated the safety culture concept in an editorial called “Culture’s confusion”. He 
seemed not to be completely satisfied with the safety culture construct, but chooses to use it 
anyway because, he says, “I know how hard it is to modify such ingrained use”: 
“Most definitions, including that used by the International Atomic Energy Authority (IAEA, 
1991) of ACSNI (1993), quoted in a number of the papers, treat it as an entity. The 
psychometric approach, resulting in a number of scales, clearly treats it as such. However, 
the view taken by Guldenmund and implied in some other papers is that we would do better 
to place organisational culture centrally and focus our measuring instruments on 
understanding that. Only as a secondary step should we then ask what the implications of 
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the dimensions we find there could be for the way we can and should manage safety to 
achieve good safety performance. Perhaps then we will find a better way through the jungle 
of scales, which the attitudinal research has produced. Hudson (1999), basing his analysis 
on Westrum’s “generative” level of development that it really places safety centrally 
enough in its basic values and their associated beliefs occupy the central focus of the 
organisation and safety problems and poor performance are then a spin-off of the centrality 
of other values. To be consistent in this approach, we should in the future only talk about 
(organisational) cultural influences on safety and not safety culture. However, I know how 
hard it is to modify such ingrained use, so I will use the latter term in the rest of this 
editorial, as do the papers in this issue (Hale, A., 2000 p 5).”  
 
   
Nick Pidgeon (1998) discusses safety culture theory and its fragmentation in the field of 
terms and definitions. He focuses on the many measures now on offer grounded in different 
industrial contexts, with few attempts to reconcile underlying frameworks or conduct meta-
analysis across databases. Pidgeon summarized it this way: “Taken as a whole it is 
probably no surprise, then, to find a proliferation of various methodologies, conceptual 
frameworks, recommendations and empirical findings in the safety culture field (Pidgeon, 
1998, p.204).” 
 
Rosness (2003) suggested that safety culture is yet another “buzzword” designed to hide 
confusion, which is a view endorsed by Zangh et al. (2002), who called safety culture a 
“chaotic concept.”  
 
Cooper (2000) discussed the limitations of safety culture and proposed a model drawn from 
social cognitive theory, emphasising the role of contextual factors and saying that safety 
culture does not operate in a vacuum. 
 
This critique of the safety culture concept might pave the way for a new construct, safety 
orientation. The main reason why safety orientation is a better construct than safety culture 
is in its theoretical and scientific ambitions. Safety orientation is meant to be a construct for 
practical purposes, making communication easier amongst other employees and 
management, management, consultants, classification societies and insurance. Since safety 
culture is such a tricky construct, it seems easier to explain to the workforce why their 
safety orientation is good or bad than to explain why their safety culture is good or bad. 
Culture is also a “neutral” construct, and even if a scientist can detect differences in culture 
as such, conclusions regarding whether a culture is “good” or “bad” are difficult to draw  
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(see Grote and Künzler, 2000; Alvesson (2001), Lawrie et al., 2006). The reasons for 
proposing “safety orientation” as a new construct are also discussed in Paper 3 (Håvold, 
2005a).  
 
 
3.10 My position on safety culture 
 
Management and employees operate in an organisational / behavioral context 
determined by the organisational culture, structure, systems and management practices. 
I believe that managing through culture is the most efficient way to manage an 
organisation. Safety culture is a subset of organisational culture. 
  
New technology, skills and infrastructure are often introduced to improve safety and 
health. Technology, skills and infrastructure also apparently increase an individual’s 
confidence; Wilde (1998), for example, has found that safety equipment such as airbags 
and ABS brakes give drivers the confidence to operate vehicles aggressively, faster, 
carelessly and with less distance between the car in front than drivers without this 
equipment. At sea, radar and electronic charts can increase safety in many situations; 
however, in other situations risk homeostasis might lead to radar-assisted and electronic 
chart-assisted accidents (Holta, 2005).  I believe that safety behaviour is found between 
a person’s ears. Attitudes, values and norms are antecedents to safety culture, which in 
turn influence safety behaviour. Wilde’s (1982) theory of risk homeostasis shows how 
safety culture can influence both how risks are perceived and how high an individual’s 
target level of risk is set, thereby resulting in adjustments to an individual’s behaviour.  
 
I believe that safety culture can be measured, and thus support the use of surveys to 
measure safety culture. I agree completely with Lord Kelvin, who said: “When you can 
measure what you are speaking about, and express it in numbers, you know something 
about it; but when you cannot measure it, when you cannot express it in numbers, your 
knowledge is of a meager and unsatisfactory kind….” (William Thompson (Lord 
Kelvin), 1824-1907).  
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This does not mean that using surveys to investigate culture is the only right approach. 
In another setting or situation, a qualitative or mixed approach could be chosen as the 
research design. However, I argue that there are many similarities between qualitative 
and quantitative data. After all, qualitative data typically consist of words, while 
quantitative data consist of numbers. These aren’t fundamentally different, because all 
qualitative data can be coded quantitatively and all quantitative data are based on 
qualitative judgment. These values can then be manipulated to help us achieve greater 
insight into the meaning of the data and to help us examine hypotheses. 
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4 Model development 
 
The safety orientation model (Fig.1.1) is intended to describe the most important features 
and attributes that influence SO. The development of the model has been shaped by a 
review of safety climate/culture models and tools/measures and contextual factors, such as 
organisational culture, national culture, professional culture, industry culture, regulations 
and markets. Nine newer papers, seen to be representative in both the work of principal 
institutions involved in safety culture/climate research and of a wide range of industries 
were reviewed and 438 items from them (Appendix 2) were chosen for the item pool used 
when the questionnaire to the main survey was developed. The safety culture factors that 
occurred with the highest frequency in the papers reviewed (Håvold, 2005a) were chosen to 
be included in the safety orientation model main questionnaire (Appendix 2), together with 
items covering the learning culture and just culture factors, as reported by Reason (1997).  
 
4.1 Safety climate/culture models and measures 
  
Mearns and Flin (1995) proposed a socio-cognitive model for risk perception in hazardous 
work environments based on the core path, attitude/beliefs, behaviour and 
incidents/accident/injuries. The same core path has also been used in a recent model by 
Lund and Aarø (2004). Helmreich and Willhelm (1998) proposed a model describing a 
relationship between professional culture, organisational culture and national culture and 
safe behaviour, using safety climate and safety culture as intermediate variables.    
Lund and Aarø (2004) and Rasmussen (1997) claim that the most obvious shortcomings of 
the theories borrowed from social psychology, such as the Theory of Reasoned Action, are 
their neglect of factors beyond their domain. These theories neglect factors like legislation, 
enforcement of legislation, economic factors and aspects of cultural, organisational and 
psychical surroundings that are widely accepted as crucial in changing safety and health 
behaviour. 
 
|In social medicine, the KAP and KAB model (Knowledge, Attitude, and 
Practice/Behaviour) have become popular when discussing behavioural change. 
Traditionally, preventive care has emphasized knowledge as a precursor of behavioural 
change. The KAP/KAB-model presupposes a one-way causal relationship from knowledge 
through attitudes to behaviour. Accordingly, clinicians often try to install positive 
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expectations about behavioural change by emphasizing health threats and enhancing long-
term positive outcome expectations using information (e.g. HIV, anti-drinking and anti- 
smoking campaigns). However, the relationship between knowledge and behaviour is not 
well documented empirically, and preventive care based on such principles may prove less 
effective (Lund and Aarø, 2004). 
  
Even if most safety culture research assumes that attitudes have a significant effect on 
behaviour (e.g. Zohar, 1980; Glennon, 1982; Lee and Harrison, 2000) and thereby on 
incidents and accidents, there are also alternative explanations (Lund and Aarø, 2004). Lund 
and Aarø (2004) include attitude modification (campaigns, posters, films, education in 
classrooms or small groups), behavioural modification (instructions, skill training, feedback 
with focus on behaviour, rewards for desired behaviour) and structural modification 
(legislation, environmental and product modification) as influential factors in their model 
for accident prevention; they emphasise human, structural and cultural factors. Lund and 
Aarø (2004) claim that the positive effects of measures such as behavioural modification 
may be accompanied by changes in attitudes, but they might also occur in the absence of 
attitude change.  
 
Measuring safety by using surveys was introduced by Zohar’s (1980) work, where he 
surveyed employee’s perceptions with regards to the organisation’s safety climate. 
Several health and safety climate/culture tools have been developed the last 5 -10 years 
covering a variety of safety critical industries; a selection of tools is briefly described in 
Table 4.1 below. The review gives some background for my research, indicating that there 
is a market and a need for these kinds of measurement tools. Several of the tools are based 
on research done at institutions represented amongst the papers reviewed in Paper 3 
(Håvold, 2005a), where the proposed safety orientation model is presented. 
 
It seems as if most of the safety climate/culture tools developed in the USA is for use in 
health care, while most of the tools developed in UK cover the offshore oil industry and the 
focus in Australia is on air transport.  Merchant shipping does not seem to have any “tailor 
made” tools currently in use.  
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i HSE (2005) 
ii http://www.jhsph.edu/publichealthnews/press_releases/PR_2000/hospital_workers.html 
iiihttp://204.108.6.79/products/documents/GAIN_OFSH_Issue_2.pdf 
iv http://www.atsb.gov.au/publications/2004/Safety_climate_factors.aspx  
v http://www.ihi.org/ 
vi http://www.ahrq.gov/qual/ 
vii http://www.tripodsolutions.net 
viii http://www.energyinst.org.uk/heartsandminds/ 
 
Table 4.1 A selection of safety climate/culture tools 
 
Name and type of tool Developed by 
organisation/ country  
Industry Type of tool 
Content 
Health and Safety Climate 
Survey Tooli (Survey) 
Health and Safety Executive 
(HSE), UK 
General 71 items organised 
into 10 factors.  
Robert Gordon University 
Computerised Safety 
Climate Questionnairei 
(Survey) 
Robert Gordon University,  
UK 
Offshore and 
contracting 
49 items organised 
into general 
information, job and 
safety attitudes.  
Offshore Safety Climate 
Questionnairei (Survey) 
Aberdeen University, UK Offshore, gas and 
power generating 
industries 
80 items organised 
into 6 factors. 
Safety Climate Assessment 
Toolkiti ( Survey) 
Loughborough University, 
UK 
Offshore industry 47 items organised 
into 5 factors. 
Safety Climate 
Questionnairei  (Survey) 
Quest Evaluation and 
Databases Ltd, UK 
Offshore drilling 319 items organised 
into 12 factors. 
Rail Safety Standards 
Board Safety Culture 
Tooli (Survey) 
Rail Safety Standards 
Board, UK 
Rail 66 items organised 
into 9 factors. 
John Hopkins University 
Safety Climate 
Questionnaireii (Survey) 
John Hopkins University, 
USA 
Hospitals 20 items organises 
into 6 factors. 
Oprators Fflight Safety 
Handbookiii (Survey) 
The Global  Aviation 
Information Network  
(GAIN) 
Aviation 25 items. No 
factors/dimensions 
seem to be extracted. 
ATSB Aviation Safety 
Surveyi iv  (Survey) 
Australian Transport 
Safety Bureau, Australia 
Aviation 38 items organised 
into 4 factors. 
Institute for Healthcare 
Research Improvement 
Safety Climate Survey v 
(Survey) 
University of Texas, USA Hospitals 
/Healthcare 
21 items. No 
factors/dimensions 
seem to be extracted. 
Agency for Health Care 
and Quality Survey vi  
(Survey) 
Agency for Healthcare 
Research and Quality USA 
Hospitals 42 items organised 
into 12 factors/areas. 
TRIPOD vii Leiden and Manchester 
Universities, Holland and 
UK 
General Profile is produced 
based on 11 basic risk 
factors.  
The Hearts and Minds 
safety programme viii 
Shell; Leiden, Manchester 
and Aberdeen universities,
 Holland and UK (Multi 
tool) 
Oil /General Uses a range of tools 
and techniques known 
as the Hearts and 
Minds Toolkit. 
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The review identified numerous tools covering several industries. One characteristic is that 
the selection of safety climate and culture tools showed no universal consensus regarding 
the definition of safety climate or safety culture, and that different tools seem to focus on 
different aspects. All safety climate and safety culture tools assessed in this review 
consisted of self-assessment questionnaires. 
 
4.2 Performance indicators 
 
Kjellen (2000) suggests six important criteria in shaping a good performance indicator: 
Observable and quantifiable, Valid indicator of the risk of loss, Sensitive to change, 
Compatible, Transparent and easily understood and Robust against manipulation. 
Performance indicators provide an effective way of measuring how an organisation is 
performing in relation to safety activities. There are many different types of performance 
indicators. The most common are outcome indicators and process indicators. Outcome 
(results) indicators show if an organisation is achieving (or failing to achieve) its targets, 
while process indicators measure the positive actions an organisation has taken to achieve 
its targets. Achievement as measured against process indicators should ensure improved 
performance against outcome indicators. For example, better attitudes or safety orientation 
should lead to a better safety performance and less accidents. The ultimate aim of 
implementing a performance measurement system is to improve the performance of an 
organisation. If you can get the performance measurement right, the data will tell you where 
you are, where you are going and how you are doing. 
 
A “safety” research programme for the offshore oil industry launched by the Norwegian 
Research Council in 2002 specifically focused on the need to develop relevant proactive 
performance measures for safety health and environment (SHE) so accidents could be 
avoided at an early stage: 
“Most indicators used to describe the development in SHE level use statistical registrations 
which show how often near misses / incidents happen in the organization. Actions taken on 
this basis are important but reactive. Particularly when near misses / incidents happen 
seldom (low frequency) it will take time before those indicators are able to show a trend. It 
is therefore important to supplement these kinds of indicators with risk-based indicators … 
The use of risk-based indicators will therefore give a more proactive grasp of the SHE work 
(Norwegian Research Council, 2002 p.6).”  
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The Balanced Scorecard (BSC) is the most widely used of the many different performance 
measurement systems that use key performance indicators (KPIs).  Kaplan and Norton 
(1996) starts their article “The Balanced Scorecard – Measures that Drive Performance” in 
the Harvard Business Review with these words: “What you measure is what you get”, and 
in doing so, underscore the importance of measuring the right things.  
 
Paper 2 (Mearns and Håvold, 2003) discussed occupational health and safety and the 
balanced scorecard. The paper was based on a benchmarking study done at Aberdeen 
University based on interviews conducted with senior managers in the UK and Norwegian 
oil and gas sector about use of the BSC in general, and with regard to health and safety 
performance indicators in particular. The senior managers both in UK and Norway had a 
positive attitude towards BSC; however, those who had implemented it indicated that there 
was a lot of room for improvement in choosing and including new indicators in the 
scorecards. The interviews revealed that the companies using BSC had mainly included 
outcome measures, but that process measures had started to find their way into the 
scorecards of some of the organisations surveyed in the study.  
 
When integrating safety into a company-wide performance measuring system like the BSC 
it is important to use at least some indicators that are proactive like the measure “safety 
orientation” suggested in this thesis.  
 
4.3 The safety orientation definition and model  
 
The safety orientation idea emerged from the market orientation construct (Narver and 
Slater, 1990; Tellefsen, 1993; Kohli and Javorsky, 1993). A marketing-oriented firm is one 
that allows the wants and needs of customers and potential customers to drive the firm’s 
strategic decisions. If this idea is rewritten and put into a safety context, we can say that a 
safety-oriented firm is committed to values important in creating safety for its employees, 
potential employees, and customers.  
  
The continuous improvement aspect of the approach is closely related to ISO 9000 (2002) 
and ISO 14000 (2002) standards, the ISM code (2002). The philosophy of continuous 
improvement advocates a system of perpetual and meaningful change. The new quality 
standards require that organisations establish "a system level procedure to facilitate 
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continual improvement." The new standard further requires that not only product output be 
measured, but that process measures and their analysis are included in management 
reviews. In other words, the new standard requires constantly striving to find better ways of 
improving hazard control and process performance. However, the most important parts of 
the model are drawn from the literature on safety, organisational and national culture.  
 
The factors in the model (Figure 1.1) are based on a literature review (Håvold, 2005a; Paper 
3). The model has a simple “core” path: attitudes/beliefs – behaviour – 
incidents/accidents/injuries as found in models by Mearns and Flin, (1995) and Lund and 
Aarø (2004). The model also includes contextual factors such as professional culture and 
organisational culture as described by Helmreich and Willhelm (1998). 
 
To construct the model, I first reviewed the major conceptual literature on organisational 
culture, safety culture/climate, quality (TQM), and organisational learning to identify the 
principal common threads. To be able to develop a model that could be tested for construct 
validity, I used what I found in the literature and "merged" it into the safety orientation 
construct.  
 
The readings resulted in a definition and a description of a safety orientation model with a 
construct that is multidimensional and comprised of several psychological, situational, 
organisational and behavioural factors.  Safety orientation might be viewed as continuous 
rather than a dichotomous construct. This conceptualisation facilitates measurement by 
avoiding certain difficulties inherent in asking informants to indicate whether or not the 
organisation is safety oriented. The proposed definition of safety orientation suggests that 
one need only access the degree to which a company is safety oriented and takes actions 
based on it. As such the "safety orientation" construct is introduced as an operational safety 
culture construct that can be used for several purposes, such as:  
• benchmarking between and within companies; 
• monitoring safety campaigns and processes; 
• safety motivation;  
• setting priorities for safety activities;   
• discussions with insurance companies, bank, authorities, 
      trade unions and other similar organisations.  
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The idea behind the model in Figure 1.1 is to measure indicators/dimensions/factors of 
safety culture and see how they interact with outcome measures in different contexts. The 
conceptual idea is that if an organisation is to consistently achieve an above normal safety 
performance, it must create an above average safety orientation. Safety orientation as a 
safety culture assessment instrument can indicate the degree of orientation towards safety in 
a group or an organisation. The desire to create an above average safety performance drives 
the organisation to create and maintain a safety orientation that will produce the necessary 
behaviour. 
 
 
4.4 Core factors of the model  
 
The literature contains many definitions of safety culture/climate constructs. Most 
definitions of safety culture/climate are global/implicit and therefore allow considerable 
latitude for interpretations; as one example, Guldenmund in a review article in Safety 
Science in 2000 provides a list of 18 different definitions (Guldenmund, 2000). Almost all 
papers reviewed on safety culture / climate include the factors: “Management 
commitment/attitudes to safety” and “Safety rules/compliance to rules” (Zohar, 1980; 
Rundmo, 1995; Brown and Holmes, 1986; Weick, 1987; Dedobbeleer and Beeland 1991, 
Mearns et. al, 2000).  
 
Safety culture is by its nature multidimensional, so that the most widely used analysis 
techniques in papers that analyse safety culture and climate has been factorial analysis 
(FA)/ principal component analysis (PCA). The number of dimensions found differs 
enormously, ranging from 2 (Dedobbeleer and Beeland, 1991) to 28 (Lee and Harrison, 
2000).  
Several organisations and authors have measured safety climate and culture using 
surveys and FA/PCA analysis (Håvold, 2005a; Paper 3). The proposed dimensions of 
the safety orientation core model described above have resulted from the findings 
presented in Paper 3 where nine papers was reviewed Cox & Cheyne (2000); Glendon 
& Litherand (2001); Grote & Künzler (2000); Harvey et al. (2002); Lee & Harrison  
(2000); Håvold (2002); Mearns et al. (2000); Rundmo & Hale (1999); Williamson et al. 
(1997). These nine papers should not be understood as the only papers suited for 
review. Rather, they were selected for detailed analysis because they were seen as being 
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representative both of the work of institutions involved in safety culture/safety climate 
research, and of a wide range of institutions. The safety factors that were mentioned 
most frequently in these nine papers were: Safety rules (8 papers), Management 
commitment and attitudes (7 papers), Communications (5 papers), Work situation (5 
papers), Knowledge and competence (4 papers), Job satisfaction (4 papers), Satisfaction 
with safety activities (3 papers), Reporting culture (3 papers), Conflict between work 
and safety (3 papers) and Fatalism (2 papers). Further, James Reason's (1997) learning 
culture and just culture were included in the model. (Figure 1). Learning culture and just 
culture were included because several reports published by Health and Safety Executive 
(HSE) (http://www.hse.gov.uk/) .Behaviour were included as an outcome variable in six 
out of nine reviewed papers. The next step in the process was to decide on the research 
design to test both hypotheses related to theory, and testing the safety orientation 
construct. 
 
Table 4.2 SO factors and outcome variables (behaviour) included in the modela 
Name “Content” Referencesb 
Satisfaction with 
safety activities 
A comprehensive measure of safety activities at work, 
including training, housekeeping, controls, inspections 
and safety improvements. 
Mearns et al., 2000; 
Håvold, 2001. 
Safety rules Refers to how practical and easy the rules are in terms of 
understanding and following without conflicting with 
work practices or when a job is rushed. 
Harvey et al. 2002; 
Mearns et al., 2000; Cox 
and Cheyne, 2000. 
Communications Refers to the degree of openness and extent to which 
communications reach all levels in the organisation.  
 
Harvey et al.2002; 
Mearns et al. 2000; Cox 
and Cheyne, 2000; 
Rundmo and Hale, 
1999. 
Attitudes/ 
Managements 
Commitment to 
safety 
Is the most important factor in this model where attitudes 
as an indicator of safety performance are discussed. The 
attitude dimension includes management commitment and 
involvement in safety work, the degree of openness and 
extent to which communications reach all levels in the 
organisation.  
Lee, 1998; Rundmo 
1992; Rundmo and 
Hale, 1999; Harvey et 
al.,   2002; Mearns et 
al., 2000; Grote and 
Künzer, 2000; Cox and 
Cheyne, 2000. 
Reporting culture How prepared employees are to report their errors and 
near misses. Such a culture depends upon how 
organisations handle blame and punishment. This does 
not mean amnesty for all unsafe acts, because that will 
reduce credibility in the eyes of the workforce.  
Reason, 1997; Mearns 
et al., 2000; Cox and 
Cheyne, 2000. 
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Learning culture 
 
To become a learning organisation is to accept a set of 
attitudes, values and practices that support the process of 
continuous learning within the organisation. 
See also chapter 3.5 
Reason, 1997; Senge, 
1990. 
Just culture A just culture is nurtured when people are encouraged, 
even rewarded for providing essential safety-related 
information, but the people working are also clear about 
where the line must be drawn between acceptable and 
unacceptable behaviour.  
Reason, 1997. 
Conflict between 
work and safety / 
Risk perception 
One of the main characteristics of a positive safety culture 
is that every individual member of an organisation accepts 
the responsibility to behave as safely as possible to avoid 
and prevent accidents. 
Harvey et al.2002; Cox 
and Cheyne, 2000; Lee 
and Harrison, 2000) 
Work situation Work situation addresses how people perceive their work. 
Several authors include work situation as one of the main 
factors influencing behaviour. Work situation includes 
conditions such as job satisfaction, psychic work 
environment, training for work and safety, time pressure, 
workload, stress, and clear rules and division of labour.  
 
Glendon and Stenton, 
2000; Rundmo et al., 
1998; Cheyne et al., 
1998; Glendon and 
Litherand, 2001; Mearns 
et al., 2000; Grote and 
Künzer, 2000; Cox and 
Cheyne, 2000; Lee and 
Harrison, 2000. 
Knowledge Knowledge and training are in themselves insufficient for 
developing a safety culture or safety orientation; however, 
research suggests that safety knowledge is an important 
factor in predicting safety compliance. The factor includes 
knowledge and understanding of rules and regulations, of 
how to behave regarding the policies, routines, processes, 
laws and systems that affect safety.  
Hofmann et al.,1995; 
Cooper, 1998; Mearns 
et al., 2000; Grote and 
Künzer, 2000; Håvold, 
2001; Neal et al., 2000. 
Job satisfaction Employees who are more satisfied with their work believe 
that the organisation will be satisfying in the long run, 
care about the quality and safety of their work, are more 
committed to the organisation and are more productive. 
Harvey et al., 2002, 
Glendon and Litherand, 
2001; Grote and 
Künzer, 2000; Rundmo 
and Hale, 1999. 
Fatalism This characteristic reflects an individual’s belief in 
destiny, that all events have been predetermined and that 
there is not much that can be done about what happens. 
This is a social construction of risk perspective.  
Rundmo and Hale, 
1999; Williamson et al., 
1997. 
Behaviour 
(OUTCOME 
VARIABLE) 
Behaviour seems to be well correlated with accident 
performance, and behaviour can be observed every time a 
job is performed. How organisations and members in 
organisations behave when it comes to work and safety 
does influence safety culture. On an individual level, a 
person’s beliefs about a risky behaviour as well as 
his/hers attitude towards accident prevention does affect 
risk perception, behavioural intentions and behaviour. 
Ajzen and Fishbein, 
1980; Rundmo, 1998. 
a The different aspects of safety culture/safety orientation following the order from left to right in the 
safety orientation model Figure 1.1.  
b Main references 
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4.5 Contextual factors 
 
In addition to contextual factors, organisational culture, national culture, professional 
culture and industry culture (described in the theory chapter), regulations and markets have 
been found to be interesting contextual factors in the model.  
 
Regulations  
According to Reason (1997), regulations are important for reducing accidents: “Regulators 
are placed to function as one of the most effective defences against organizational 
accidents.” (p. 182). According to Lund and Aarø (2004), legislation and regulations 
influence attitudes and beliefs and the way they are enforced and controlled will influence 
the effect. Rasmussen and Svedung (2000) see legislation as a major external determinant 
of judgement and actions in enterprises. The theoretical basis for legislation and regulations 
are the positivist philosophy, which maintains that law is a purely human construct that 
society uses to maintain order. Regulatory approaches can be used to interpret the 
authorities’ significance in accident prevention. Regulations and how the regulations are 
implemented might influence decision-making in the companies differently, dependent on 
cultures and subcultures. Regulations might differ between industries, branches or type of 
vessel. A legislative framework often forms the basis of the occupational health and safety 
system, along with policies in the work place and international regulations that have been 
agreed within the IMO framework focus on safety at sea. 
 
Markets 
The theory behind markets has its basis in behavioural economics, which is a combination 
of psychology and economics that investigates what happens in markets where human 
limitations and complications appear (Simon, 1987). 
It might not be easy to put safety first when the company’s existence is at stake.  Perrow 
(1999) suggests an explanation as to why he believes management does not put safety first:  
“For example; few managers are punished for not putting safety first even after an 
accident, but will quickly be punished for not putting profits, market share, or agency 
prestige first.” (p368).  
 
How markets might function is described by OECD’s Maritime Transport Committee 
(2003), which shows how unscrupulous operators realise significant savings of up to US$ 1 
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million each year for an average tanker not meeting minimum safety requirements, 
exchanging profits for safety.  
 
Organisational culture are dealt with in chapter 3.1, National culture in chapter 3.2, 
Professional culture in chapter 3.3 and Industry culture in chapter 3.4. 
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5 Materials and methods 
 
At the heart of any research activity is the development of an effective research design and 
finding the most suitable methods of investigation. One has to decide on research 
instruments, sampling plan and the types of data to collect.  
 
5.1 Research design 
 
Both quantitative methods and qualitative methods have strength and weaknesses. 
Quantitative methods can provide a high level of measurement precision and statistical 
power, while qualitative methods can supply greater depth of information about attitudes, 
perceptions, relationships and performance in a particular research setting. The research 
design for this project depends on the objectives, delimitations and assumptions given 
earlier in the paper. The design has also been influenced by personal inclinations and 
technical and financial restraints. 
 
However, employing the quantitative method allows:  
• A statement of the research problem in very specific, definable, and set terms;  
• The specifying of independent and the dependent variables clearly and precisely;  
• The original set of research goals to be followed;  
• The achievement of high levels of reliability in data gathered due to a mass survey 
approach;  
• Testing of the research hypotheses;  
• And arriving at more objective conclusions by minimizing judgement subjectivity.  
 
Deductive research is conducted using a quantitative cross-sectional approach to measure 
variables. This does not suggest that qualitative, inductive research couldn’t improve 
answers given by the quantitative survey approach, for example during the initial phase, 
when working with focus groups or when experience surveys could have improved the 
selection of items and scales. 
 
As has been stated on page 2, the aim of the research designs used for Papers 4, 5 and 6 in 
this thesis is to: undertake surveys testing elements of "safety orientation" on individuals, 
companies, nationalities on a population of seafarers working for Norwegian-owned 
shipping companies. 
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5.2 Development of questionnaires  
 
Two questionnaires have been developed and used in the papers presented in this thesis.  
It is important that an item pool be a rich source containing a large number of items that are 
relevant to the content of interest, from which a scale can emerge. Loevinger (1957) offered 
the classic articulation of this principle:  
“The items of the pool should be chosen so as to sample all possible contents which might 
comprise the putative trait according to all known alternative theories of the trait (p.659). “ 
 
 
Clark et al. (1995) suggest that questionnaires include content that ultimately will be shown 
to be tangential or even unrelated to the core construct. Redundancy with respect to content 
is an asset (DeVillis, 1991; Anastasi & Urbina, 1997). Paul Spector (1992) describes the 
importance of using existing scales in the process of constructing a survey instrument: 
 
"If scales exist to measure the construct of interest, the content of these existing scales may 
help scale development. It is not unusual to develop a scale out of existing scales. This may 
be done in domains where a high quality scale does not exist. The items from several scales 
can be used as a starting point in writing an item pool. These would be modified and more 
items added to create the item pool from which the final scale will be developed."  (Spector 
1992:16) 
 
 
Questionnaire 1 (40 items) / paper 4.  
Two nautical students I supervised who were doing their BSc thesis at Ålesund University 
College collected the material for Paper 4. Initial development of the questionnaire was 
based on a literature review. Two items were selected from a questionnaire measuring 
concentration of authority (Aiken and Haige, 1968) and 17 items from safety questionnaires 
(Rundmo and Hale, 1999; Mearns et al., 2000; Cox and Cheyne, 2000, Lee and Harrison, 
2000; Grote and Künzler, 2000). Some of the items were slightly changed to fit the 
hierarchical structure found aboard a vessel. Twenty-one items were developed for that 
particular survey. A pilot study (n = 6) was carried out before the study. The questionnaire 
was produced only in English because it was the working language in the shipping 
company. All items used a 6–point Likert scales, ranging from strongly agree to strongly 
disagree. The items included in the questionnaire are shown in Appendix 1 in Paper 4 
(Håvold, 2005b).    
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Questionnaire 2 (147 items) / paper 5 and 6.  
According to Hale (2000) there has  been a tendency in safety culture  research to start from 
scratch when scales and items have been developed: “hardly any scales have been reused in 
the same form in several studies, and when that has happened, the factor structures and 
results have not usually been replicated.” 
 
Based on extensive review of the safety climate and culture literature, several aspects of the 
safety orientation measure were identified. The questionnaire was designed to cover key 
factors found in a literature review of safety culture and climate. An item pool of 438 items 
was drawn from nine newer papers and reports discussed in Paper 3. The 438 items were 
screened for redundancy before scales and items were chosen according to the safety 
orientation model (Håvold 2001, 2005a) shown in Figure 1.1.  
 
An important variable in this model is behaviour; four different scales measuring behaviour 
were chosen for inclusion in the questionnaire. The questionnaire has a total of 147 items; 
20 national culture items (Hofstede’s VTM questionnaire); 97 safety items that should be 
answered by all and 20 safety items only for officers. In addition, the questionnaire had 14 
nominal questions asking information about age, sex, education, occupation, how long they 
had been a sailor, how long they had worked for their present employer, whether they have 
been involved in accidents or dangerous situations the last year and in their career as a 
seafarer.   
 
The Likert scale was selected as the format of measurement for safety orientation because it 
is the most widely used instrument measuring opinions, beliefs and attitudes, and it is 
relatively easy to construct compared to other interval scales.  Most scales measuring 
organisational culture and safety culture/climate also use the Likert format. According to 
some statisticians, the Likert scale should be treated as ordinal, unless we can prove 
otherwise. However, to able to perform calculations, I have adopt a pragmatic view often 
followed by social researchers and have treated the ordinal Likert scale as if it was an 
interval.  
Appendix 2 shows the safety questionnaire used in Paper 5 and 6. 
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Factor Number of 
items 
Reference 
Satisfaction with 
safety activities 
8 Mearns et al. 2000, Alpha 0.89 
Rules and regulations 4 + 3 Mearns et al. 2000, Alpha 0.63 
 Håvold (2001; 2005b) Alpha 0.72 
Communications 5 Mearns et al. 2000; Alpha 0.7  
Cox & Cheyne 2000, Alpha 0.73 
Attitudes/Management 
commitment 
8 + 6 Mearns et al. 2000; Alpha 0.87  
Håvold (pilot study);Alpha 0.76 
“Reporting culture” 5 + 2 + 1 New development  
Mearns et al. 2000, Alpha 0.76 
Cox and Cheyne. 2000 
“Learning culture” 4 New development 
“Just culture” 3 New development 
Conflict between work 
and safety 
6 Cox & Cheyne 2000, Alpha 0.78 
Work situation 6  Glendon and Litherand, 2001 Alpha 0.89 
Knowledge 5 Håvold (2001; 2005b) Alpha 0.84 
Job satisfaction 6 Lee and Harrison 2000, Alpha 0.84 
Fatalism 7 Rundmo & Hale, 1999, Alpha 0.76 
Behaviour 4 + 4 + 4 + 
4 
Williamson et al 1997, Alpha 0.84 
Håvold (2001; 2005b) Alpha 0.68 
Mearns et al. 2000, Alpha 0.90 
Mearns et al. 2000, Alpha 0.70 
All in all item 1  
b The different aspects of safety culture/safety orientation following the order from left to right in the 
safety orientation model shown in Figure 1.1. 
 
 
The finalised questionnaire measured 12 antecedents of safety orientation and one outcome 
variable, behaviour. The different aspects covered and where the items and scales were 
taken from are shown in Table 5.1. For the “behaviour” outcome variable, four different 
scales were included in the questionnaire. Three different scales covering different aspects 
of work situation were included for the work situation variable. Two scales measuring 
management commitment were also included.  
 
All scales used in the paper were Likert scales, using a six-point response format (e.g. from 
“strongly disagree” to “strongly agree” with no neutral middle point), even though other 
authors have used five- or seven-point Likert scales in their research. DeVellis (1991) 
suggests that either odd or even number of choices can be used for the response scale 
depending upon the phenomenon being investigated and the goals of the investigator. 
Norwegians, Australians and UK researchers created the scales and items used in the 
Table 5.1 Aspects of safety culture included in the 97-item safety questionnaire b
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questionnaire, and as such the study contains a “European” bias. The questionnaire was 
pilot tested amongst 20 nautical students and experienced seafarers attending a course at a 
simulator centre. It was produced originally in an English version, which was translated into 
a Norwegian equivalent. The questionnaire was then retranslated into English to cheek the 
translation.   
 
 
5.3 Sampling and collection of data 
 
Two questionnaires have been used in the empirical papers in this thesis. DeVillis (1991) 
suggests that 300 people is an adequate number when constructing scales, but he writes that 
scales have been successfully developed with smaller sample. Both surveys consist of more 
than 300 completed returns and can therefore seen to be adequate for constructing scales. 
 
The research presented in Paper 4 is based on data collected from employees at a big 
Norwegian shipping company with multiethnic crew. The ships names were drawn from a 
fleet-list provided by the ship-owner. The vessels in the sample were mainly Bulk/Container 
ships ranging in size from 39 000 DWT (Dead Weight Tonnes) to 51 000 DWT, built from 
1982 to 1998, with a crew of around 25. The questionnaire was sent by e-mail to 20 vessels 
(N = 486) where the shipmaster made copies and handed it out to the entire crew. The first 
page of the questionnaire emphasised that replies were anonymous, that respondent 
participation was voluntary, and that they should answer it honestly. When the question 
form was completed it was collected by the shipmaster and returned by mail. The data was 
collected at the end of March and the beginning of April in 2001. Respondents came from 
15 out of 20 ships, and for vessels that answered, the response rate varied from 48% to 
100%, with an average of 80%.  When the five vessels that did not answer were taken into 
consideration, the response rate was 60%. In addition the questionnaire was handed out by 
one of the students who collected the data to a seminar for officers that the ship owner held 
in Manila.  A total of 349 questionnaires were collected, 287 from the ships and 62 from the 
seminar in Manila. 
  
The sampling used in Paper 6 was conducted in two stages. First, 24 shipping companies 
were randomly drawn from three strata (tank, dry cargo and passenger) taken from the ship-
info com database (http://www.ship-info.com ). On stage two between 2 and 12 vessels were 
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randomly selected from each shipping company depending on the size of the shipping 
company, which is a sampling method called cluster sampling. In this case, each vessel was 
a cluster where the whole crew was selected. There were several reasons for the choice of 
sampling design: first of all I wanted to compare ship owners and vessels in some analyses, 
and secondly a simple random sampling would be difficult because the rotating system in 
shipping would make it complicated and expensive. However a list of ship owners and 
vessels (clusters) was ready available at a database (www.ship-info.com).  A letter 
explaining the project and asking for permission to collect data aboard their vessels was 
sent to the shipping company’s managing director or the ship owner, with a letter from the 
Norwegian Ship owners’ Association recommending the project (Appendix 3). Two of the 
20 shipping companies had no vessels at the time the survey was performed and two 
companies turned down the invitation for different reasons, so the final version of the 
questionnaire was distributed to vessels from 16 shipping companies. A package containing 
the agreed number of questionnaires in English and Norwegian was sent to an agreed 
contact person aboard the vessel together with an information letter for the contact person, 
and “posters” telling the seafarers what the data was to be used for. The completed 
questionnaires were sent from the vessels to the ship-owner in a sealed envelope, which was 
then forwarded directly to the author.  The survey was conducted between June and 
September 2002. The survey has an estimated response rate of 70 %. A total of 2558 
questionnaires from 16 shipping companies with seafarers from 27 countries was part of the 
survey.   
 
The participants voluntarily took part in the study, and information on project aims and 
confidentiality preceded the collection of data. To protect confidentiality, the names of 
vessels and ship-owners have not been reported, and results from a group level have only 
been reported for work groups exceeding 10 persons.   
 
 
5.5 Statistical analyses 
 
Paper 4 (Safety culture in a Norwegian shipping company) used PCA, canonical 
correlation, multiple regression analysis, multiple discriminant analysis and correlation 
analysis as statistical tools. PCA was chosen because it is the predominant view in the 
literature that PCA best describes the original data in a simplified way, with minimal 
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loss of information (Collins, 1980; Hair et al. 2006). The goal of both correlation and 
regression analysis was to test hypotheses investigating relationships between variables, 
and whether change in one variable was associated with changes in another. Canonical 
correlation allows the investigation of relationships between two sets of variables. In 
this case the relationship between three variables measuring “level of safety” and all 
safety items in the questionnaire, as well as four factors from the factor analysis was 
investigated. Canonical correlation was chosen because of a recommendation from one 
of the paper’s reviewers.  The reason for choosing multiple regression analysis was to 
learn more about and test the relationship between the factors from the factor analysis 
(independent variables) and Port state control ratio (dependent variables). Multiple 
discriminant analysis (MDA) adopts a perspective similar to PCA, but PCA and MDA 
are mathematically different in what they maximize. MDA maximizes the difference 
between the values of the dependent variables, whereas PCA maximizes the variance in 
all the variables accounted for by the factor.  
 
Principal component analysis (PCA) revealed 11 factors when the Kaiser eigenvalue rule 
was used and 4 factors when the scree test criterion was used. The factor structure found in 
the material confirmed structures found by researchers in other industries. The relative 
importance of the factors found in the factor analysis of behavioural measures was tested by 
regression analysis and the results confirmed that several factors were influential across 
industries. Two canonical correlations was performed, the first between three “level of 
safety” dependent variables and 38 “safety items” as independent variables, second between 
three “level of safety” variables as dependent variables and four “safety” factors as 
independent variables. The results showed that the dependent variables measuring “level of 
safety” were all significantly correlated with each other, with two of the factors and 15 of 
the items.To determine whether differences existed between occupations, between 
nations and between vessels, the factors from the PCA were subjected to MDA. 
Significant differences between occupations, between nations and between vessels were 
found for one or more of the factors from the PCA, but different factors were shown to 
be responsible for the findings. Knowledge was a significant discriminator between 
occupations, while employees and management’s attitude to safety was a significant 
discriminator between vessels and between nationalities.  
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Paper 6 (From safety culture to safety orientation: Validation and Simplification of a safety 
orientation scale using a sample of seafarers working for Norwegian ship owners) 
combined exploratory factor analysis (EFA) and confirmatory factor analysis (CFA) as its 
analytical tools. The sample of seafarers was split in two sub-samples, a calibration sample 
and a validation sample, as recommended by Hair et al. (2006) and van Proijen and van der 
Kloot (2001). EFA was used on one sub-sample to generate theories about the constructs 
underlying SO; the analysis was then followed up with a CFA using the other sub-sample. 
Different criteria for factors to extract and retain in an EFA was discussed which resulted in 
a shortened scale of the Latent Root Criterion (LRCSS) and the Parallel Analysis Criterion 
(PC), which were analysed further in the CFA. The results from the CFA showed that all 
measurement models (Tables 5, 6, 7, 8 and 9 in Paper 6) had acceptable fit indices. 
However, the LRCSS models showed a better fit than the PC models. The structural models 
(Tables 10 and 11 in Paper 6) show the estimation results from eight models based on the 
LRCSS and PC approach, confirming the results found in the measurement models. 
 
Several assumptions like normality, linearity, homoscedasticity, absence of correlated 
errors in the data were checked and addressed before statistical analyses were performed 
(Hair et al. 2006). See Papers 4, 5 and 6 for a more detailed discussion.  
 
 
5.6 Validity and reliability 
 
Reliability  
Scales are reliable to the extent that they are comprised of reliable items that share the 
common latent variable (safety orientation). The most common way to measure reliability 
of a scale is to use Cronbach’s alpha. Cronbach’s alpha corresponds closely to the classical 
definition of reliability as the proportion of variance in a scale that is attributable to the true 
score of the latent variable. Cronbach’s alpha is used as reliability measure in Papers 4 and 
6. Papers 6 also use variance extracted and construct reliability to indicate convergent 
validity.    
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One of the main aims in Paper 6 (From safety culture to safety orientation: Validation and 
simplification of a safety orientation scale using a sample of seafarers working for 
Norwegian ship owners) is to validate the safety orientation scale (SOS).  
 
Content validity, criterion-related validity and construct validity were established. The 
criterion-related validity is established if the scale performs as expected in relation to other 
variables or criteria. In this paper, two different criteria show evidence of criterion validity 
in the SOS. The summated SOS score was first correlated with the summated score self-
reported work behaviour and then with an all-in-all question on safety. Both correlations are 
significant and indicate criterion-related validity.  
 
Content validity is the extent to which individual scale items provide adequate coverage of 
the problem. This kind of validity is assessed in a more subjective way. It is closely related 
to theory, but lacks well defined objective criteria upon which it can be based. The 
measures developed for the SOS were derived from an exhaustive literature review and by 
evaluation by both practitioners and academics. Although the judgements about content 
validity are subjective, the procedures used are consistent with ensuring content validity 
(DeVillis, 1991; Spector, 1992).   
    
Construct validity (Cronbach & Meehl, 1955) is directly concerned with the theoretical 
relationship of a variable (e.g. score on some scale) to other variables. It is the extent to 
which a measure "behaves" the way that the construct it purports to measure should behave 
with regard to established measures of other constructs. This is taken best addressed with 
the CFA approach. Paper 6 adopts a two-step confirmatory modelling strategy with a focus 
on construct validation (convergent, discriminant and nomological) in both steps. An 
important part of scale validation is the testing and interpretation of the structural model 
(step two). Section 3.4.1 in Paper 6 is where all measurement models were tested for 
convergent and discriminant validity. Despite some minor problems with both convergent 
and discriminant validity for a few of the concepts, the overall fit and the correlations 
between the constructs indicated congruent and concentric measurement models. Figure 2 
sums up the main findings based on the Latent Root Criteria short scale (LRCSS). All seven 
antecedents/factors were well defined concepts passing both convergent and (conservative) 
Validity 
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discriminant validity tests. All path coefficients had the expected sign, and the overall fit for 
the structural model was good.  
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6 Research papers 
 
The following summarises findings from the 6 research papers listed in Appendix 1. Figure 
1.2 “Structure of the thesis” describes the relationship between the six papers and the 
introduction and conclusion. 
 
6.1 Culture in maritime safety (Paper 1) 
(Published in Maritime Policy and Management, .27(1),, pp. 79-88 2000) 
 
Culture in maritime safety is the first step of the thesis. This paper reviewed research on 
safety culture/climate in a maritime context up to 1998. Since the literature used is rather 
old, later papers (Papers 2 to 6) and the introduction and conclusion cover more recent 
research on safety culture/climate.  
 
The paper indicated that very little research had been done on maritime safety culture and 
climate. A broader scope had to be taken, and material from industry and air safety was 
included in the review. With this broader view several factors appeared to influence safety 
culture/climate, amongst them management commitment and employee involvement were 
the most important. However research indicated that safety culture/climate had an effect on 
intermediary variables like communications, decision-making, conflict-solving, attitudes, 
motivation, and leadership. The research reviewed in this paper also indicated a clear link 
between the intermediary variables and accidents. National culture was the most intriguing 
of the contextual factors that could influence safety culture. 
 
The papers reviewed also supported a multi-causal nature of accidents and multidisciplinary 
and multilevel aspects of safety and risk, showing the need for close cooperation between 
different levels to reduce risk. 
 
Some researchers consider climate and culture to be almost the same construct, while others 
might say that climate is only one indicator of a broader culture construct. The review found 
the “competing” culture and climate constructs (organisational climate/culture and safety 
climate/culture) to be “cooperating” constructs with a very large overlap.  
 
Further studies were recommended in four areas: 
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• Transfer of findings in industry and air safety to maritime safety. 
• Determine the most important cultural factors affecting maritime safety. 
• Investigate the effects of culture on risk aversion and risk taking, and how culture 
can affect safety in times of increasing production pressures and in critical 
situations. 
• Develop indicators for maritime safety, which can be used by classification and 
insurance companies.  
 
 
 
6.2 Occupational health and safety and the balanced scorecard (Paper 2) 
(Published in The TQM Magazine, 15(6), pp. 408-423 2003. 
 
This paper took the performance indicators used in an offshore health-and-safety 
benchmarking study carried out by Aberdeen University on 13 offshore installations 
operating on the UK Continental Shelf and related them to the balanced scorecard 
(BSC) framework. The results from the benchmarking study were discussed from the 
perspective of suggesting which indicators should populate each aspect of the BSC: 
financial, customer, internal business and learning and growth.  In addition, the paper 
included the results of interviews conducted with senior managers in the UK and the 
Norwegian oil and gas sectors about the use of the BSC in general and with regard to 
health and safety indicators in particular. The reasons for including occupational health 
and safety in the BSC and reports/papers covering occupational health and safety 
indicators and the BSC were discussed. The costs of an accident are often 
underestimated, particularly indirect costs, which might be from 8 to 37 times the 
recoverable insured costs.   The interviews with managers indicated that occupational 
health and safety was important for the companies in oil and gas related industries that 
had implemented BSC. The companies using BSC had mainly included outcome 
measures in their approach, but process measures are starting to find their way onto 
scorecards.   
  
 
6.3 Measuring occupational safety: from safety culture to safety 
      orientation? (Paper 3)  
        (Published in Policy and Practice in Health and Safety, 03(1), pp. 85-105, 2005) 
 
This paper reviewed measures of safety culture and safety climate, and took the view that 
broadly defined; the two measures can be regarded as one construct. Many authors have 
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criticised the safety culture concept because it is too broad, has too many definitions, is too 
confusing/vague, the contextual factors are not focused, or that it lacks validation. These 
criticisms together with considerable disagreement among scientists as to how safety culture 
should be defined have influenced how practitioners perceive the usefulness of this concept 
in their organisations. Sometimes neither management nor employees understand the 
content and antecedents of the cultural concept. This critique of the safety culture concept 
suggests that a more pragmatic approach using its “best” parts might be useful in an 
organisational context. The paper proposed a new construct called “safety orientation”, 
which is an operational construct of safety culture/climate and as a first step towards a more 
practical instrument for benchmarking safety. 
 
The main emphasis in this paper was to review scales and items used to measure safety 
climate and culture in the social, psychological and organisational psychology traditions. 
Nine newer papers were selected for a detailed review, representing some important areas 
that used surveys to measuring safety culture/climate. The criteria for selection of papers 
are described in Paper 3. The safety culture and safety climate factors occurring with 
highest frequency in the reviewed papers were selected to be included in the safety 
orientation model proposed on p.98 in the paper. These were: Safety rules, management 
attitudes to safety, safety behaviour, communications, work situation, job satisfaction, 
knowledge, conflict between work and safety, satisfaction with safety activities, reporting 
culture and fatalism; additionally, two of James Reason’s (1997) factors, learning culture 
and just culture, were included in the model. The model also included six contextual 
factors: professional culture, industry culture, organisational culture, regulations, markets 
and national culture. 
 
The review showed that almost all safety culture and climate scales and items were “new” 
developments, even though many of papers reviewed stated the importance of moving 
towards a set of core scales and items in measuring safety culture. Scales were used by 
more than one survey/author in only a few exceptional cases. Hale (2000) also says: “there 
is a tendency for each researcher to start from scratch again” (p.11) and “no researcher 
can claim that the questionnaires and scales they have developed and used are anything 
like fully validated” (p.11).  
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The analysis suggests that researchers have found it difficult to move from first, exploratory 
stages to confirmation and causal stages that would allow for agreement on industry 
standards that could be used as benchmarks. However, the review also detected encouraging 
signs that the field may be moving in that direction. 
 
This paper included a careful evaluation of Andrew Hale’s critique of the research domain. 
Validated and reliability-tested scales to measure safety climate and culture were adapted 
from the nine papers/ questionnaires reviewed in the process of constructing the proposed 
safety orientation questionnaire, which was later used to collect data for Papers 5 and 6.  
 
Further research was suggested in testing the model or parts of the model, finding reliable 
outcome variables, performing multilevel analyses, simplifying the indicators and models, 
and a large scale research project covering several industries and countries was proposed.   
 
 
6.4 Safety culture in a Norwegian shipping company. (Paper 4) 
(Published in Journal of Safety Research 36/5 pp. 441-458, 2005). 
 
The paper focused on some elements of the safety culture construct in a Norwegian 
shipping company. The paper tested five hypotheses:  
H 1: That the factor structure obtained from the data would confirm previous research in 
other industries. 
The factor analysis supported the hypothesis by producing a factor structure that was very 
similar to the factor structure produced by research in industries other than shipping.  The 
factors that loaded strongest were knowledge, management’s attitude to safety, safety 
behaviour, attitudes to safety rules and safety and quality experience.  
 
H 2: The relative importance of the factors obtained would confirm previous research from 
other industries. 
Two canonical correlations indicated a significant relationship between “level of safety” 
and several factors from the factor analysis. Some of the most important factors reported 
from other industries also seemed to be among the most important in shipping. A regression 
analysis indicated that the most important factor that explained the variation in the Port 
State Control ratio was employee and management’s attitude to safety and quality, which 
fits well with findings from other industries. Hypothesis 2 seems therefore to be supported 
by the data analyses.  
 
H 3:  The perception of the importance of safety issues across nationalities would be 
shared. 
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The analysis showed that this hypothesis is not supported. National cultures discriminated 
significantly for two of the factors from the factor analysis: employee and management‘s 
attitude to safety and quality, and safety and quality experience.  
 
H 4: The perception of the importance of safety issues across occupations would be shared. 
The analysis showed that this hypothesis was not supported. The result showed that all 
occupational groups shared the perception that safety is important. However, significant 
differences emerged for the “knowledge” factor.  The officers and especially the masters 
reported better knowledge than the rest of the crew, and the galley section and ratings 
registered somewhat less positively than the rest of the crew. 
 
H 5: The perception of the importance of safety issues across vessels will be shared. 
The findings did not support this hypothesis. All vessels showed factor scores on the 
positive side. However, significant differences between vessels for factors from the PCA 
analysis supported the view that each vessel is a small society, with its own sub-culture.   
 
The problem of finding reliable and valid outcome measures for risk and safety was 
discussed.  This is a challenge because accidents are subject to random fluctuations, and 
data on near accidents are difficult to collect.  
 
Port State Control is the inspection of foreign ships in national ports to verify that the 
condition of the ship and its equipment comply with the requirements of international 
regulations and that the ship is manned and operated in compliance with these rules. It is 
possible to calculate a Port State Control ratio by using the number of non-conformities as a 
percentage of the number of Port State Controls, which can then be used as a kind of 
outcome variable for each vessel. 
 
 The research indicated an empirical link between a set of safety culture perceptions and 
safety behaviour as measured by the Port State Control ratio. A regression showed that the 
factor “employee and management’s attitude towards safety and quality” explained 50% of 
the variance of the Port State Control ratio.  
 
 
6.5 National cultures and safety orientation: A study of seafarers working for 
Norwegian shipping companies (Paper 5) 
(Work & Stress, 21(2), pp. 173-195; 2007) 
 
The main objective of this paper was to examine the influence of national cultures on 
safety orientation.  
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This was achieved by using the “safety orientation” model (Figure 1) and Hofstede’s 
dimensions of national culture (Hofstede, 2001) on a multinational sample of sailors 
working on Norwegian-owned vessels. The paper tested four hypotheses:   
• H1: The factors found in an individual-level factor analysis will not be 
replicated in a national-level factor analysis. 
The findings supported that hypothesis. The individual level factor analysis 
produced 16 factors, while the ecological factor analysis (national level) 
produced four factors. Many of the items that loaded in the individual factor 
analysis did not load on the ecological factor analysis and vice versa. The four 
factors from the ecological factor analysis explained 83.7% of the variance, 
while the 16 factors from the individual factor analysis explained less of the 
variance (57%).  
 
• H2: The perception of the importance of safety issues measured by the factors 
from the factor analyses will not be shared across nations. 
The findings partly supported this hypothesis.  All nations seemed to show 
positive attitudes towards safety and risk issues; however, significant differences 
between regions and countries were found. The findings indicated that there 
might be “regional” cultures (Northern Europe, Eastern Europe and South East 
Asia) on all four factors in the ecological factor analysis.  
 
• H3: There will be a difference between vessels having a multinational crew and 
vessels having crews from a single country with respect to perception of risk and 
attitudes toward safety. 
The findings partly supported this hypothesis. GLM-MANOVA showed that 
crew from a single nation and crew from more than two nations seemed to be 
grouped together in having significantly more positive attitudes towards safety 
than vessels with crew from two nationalities.   
 
• H4: National culture as measured by Hofstede’s factors will be related to 
attitudes toward safety and risk as measured via the factors of the factor 
analysis. 
This hypothesis was supported. A significant correlation between some factors 
from the factor analysis and the indices for national culture was found.  
 
 
Several areas of future research were suggested.  For example, some factors in the 
safety orientation model may have a greater effect on safety behaviour than others. It 
would be important to examine which factors in the model are the most important in 
order to simplify the safety orientation model presented in Figure 1.  Another area of 
research might be to investigate if a sailor’s loyalty is to his country, to the shipping 
company, to his peers in the profession, or to his colleagues. A research project that 
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examines whether or not there is an increased safety risk when national culture conflicts 
with the values and norms of an organisational or professional culture would be a 
natural next step in expanding the understanding of safety orientation and national 
culture.  
 
 
6.6 From Safety Culture to Safety Orientation: Validation of a safety 
orientation scale on a sample of seafarers working on Norwegian-owned 
vessels. (Paper 6) 
(Submitted to Safety Science) 
 
The paper had three main goals. The first was to see if scales were stable across industries 
and cultures, the second was to focus on retention rules for factor retention in EFA, and the 
third was to validate the SO model. Several authors have suggested that at least some safety 
culture/climate factors could be stable both across industries and cultures. Table 1 (in Paper 
6) shows that the A Priori Criterion of EFA produced scales with very good internal 
consistency. The 12 scales replicated had Cronbach’s alphas ranging from .65 to .93, whilst 
the original Cronbach’s alphas were from .60 to .90.  From the present research it appeared 
that scales and items measuring SO were stable across nationalities, industries and 
organisations, and the findings appeared very promising for developing a general tool 
measuring safety orientation.  
 
The second aim was to focus on the retention rules in EFA. EFA is the preferred procedure 
for use in safety culture and safety climate scale development.  Factor retention seems to be 
the most important choice to be made because it as appears that there is robustness across 
the choice of factor analysis methods and types of rotation (Zweck and Velicer, 1986; 
Hayton et al. 2004). Several rules were used to determine the number of factors and 
individual items to be retained (A Priori Criterion; Latent Root Criterion; Percentage of 
Variance Criterion; Scree Test Criterion and Parallel Criterion); however, the process 
described in the paper left only a short form of the Latent Root Criterion (LRCSS) and 
Parallel Criterion (PC) for further analyses. This research indicated that LRCSS was 
superior to the PC. 
 
  76
The third aim was to validate and simplify the SO model. Criterion-related validity, content 
validity and construct related validity were all assessed. The summated safety orientation 
scale performed as expected in relation to two different criteria, a summated score of self 
reported behaviour and an all-in-all question on safety both indicating criterion-related 
validity. Criterion –related validity of a scale is established if the scale performs as expected 
in relation to other variables that have been selected as meaningful criteria. Content validity 
is defined as the extent to which individual scale items express the meanings included in the 
concept.  The measures developed for SO were derived from an exhaustive literature review 
and by an evaluation by both practitioners and academics. Although judgements about 
content validity are subjective, the procedures used are consistent with ensuring content 
validity (DeVellis, 1991; Spector, 1992). The paper adopted a two-step confirmative 
modelling strategy with a focus on construct validity (convergent, discriminant and 
nomological) in both steps. The measurement models were tested for convergent and 
discriminant validity. The overall fit and correlation indicated congruent and concentric 
measurement models. In the second step the structural models were validated through 
testing and interpretation, indicating good validity (see Figure 2 in Paper 6). 
 
The SO model revisited (Figure 7.1 in Paper 6) showed that the process described in the 
paper  resulted in a much simpler model than the one presented in Figure 1.1. The re-
specification of the model on the basis of the CFA for four different behavioural measures 
gave a simplified and well-defined model with seven factors and 22 items. 
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7 Discussion 
 
The present study defines, describes and tests parts of the SO model, which can be looked at 
as an operational definition of safety culture. The main purpose was to develop a tool to 
measure SO in shipping. The research aims have been both to contribute to the testing of 
selected hypotheses regarding to safety culture (Papers 4 and 5) and develop a tool to 
measure safety orientation in shipping (Papers 3 and 6). The theoretical framework 
described in section 3 is taken into consideration in the following discussions.  
 
7.1 Substantial findings 
 
One might expect that the high accident rates among seafarers -- 11 to 26 times higher than 
the average among the workforce ashore (Hansson, 1996; Roberts, 2002) -- would have 
resulted in research on safety climate/culture in the maritime sector. The author found that 
no such research on safety climate/culture in the maritime sector had been done (Paper 1: 
Håvold, 2000). This finding was later confirmed by Sten and Fjerdingen (2003). However, 
some research has been published in recent years on the safety climate/culture in the 
maritime sector (see chapter 2.4).  
 
The author found that most of the factors in the SO model could measure safety across both 
industries and cultures. Most research on safety culture and climate has been conducted in 
the areas of air and rail transport, nuclear power production, the chemical, processing and 
construction industries and offshore oil production. Based on this previous research, the 
current study presents an instrument to measure safety orientation among seafarers. The 
twelve scales developed and presented in Paper 3 were further developed in Paper 6 and 
replicated surprisingly well on the sample of seafarers working for Norwegian ship owners. 
The multinational sample of seafarers produced a Cronbach’s alpha ranging from .65 to .93 
on the twelve scales, whilst the original Cronbach’s alphas were from .63 to .90, indicating 
that scales can be used across both industries and nationalities.  
 
EFA is the preferred procedure in safety culture and safety climate scale development. 
Factor retention seems to be the most important choice to be made. A variety of researchers 
investigating this subject  (Hayton et al, 2004; Zwich and Velicier, 1982, 1986; Velicier et 
al., 2000; Glorfeld, 1995; Ledisma et al., 2007) maintain that parallel criteria for factor 
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retention is the approach that most accurately recovers the true number of factors in a 
dataset. They also seem to have a limited confidence in the latent root criteria for factor 
retention. This research found that a short form of the latent root criteria was superior to the 
parallel criteria (Paper 6: Håvold and Nesset, 2007; Tables 7, 8,9,10 and 11). 
 
National cultures as measured by Hofstede’s indices seem to discriminate significantly 
between several safety factors and should therefore be included as one of the contextual 
factors that influence safety. Paper 4 (Håvold, 2005b) indicated that vessels with an all-
Indian crew were the most positive on the safety culture scales. Paper 5 (Håvold, 2007) 
confirmed that national cultures discriminated significantly for the safety orientation factors 
on all four factors from the ecological factor analysis and all 15 factors from the individual 
factor analysis. 
 
The Tukey HSD post hoc test, which groups dependent variables into homogenous subsets, 
grouped Norway and the Netherlands together in the same subset for 4 out of 4 factors; 
Poland and Latvia into the same subset for 4 out of 4 factors; and Philippines and India into 
the same subset for 3 out of 4 factors. This might indicate “regional” cultures for all four 
factors from the ecological factor analysis (Paper 5: Håvold, 2007). 
 
A MANOVA indicated significant differences among vessels with crew from one, two, and 
more than two nations for all factors from the ecological factor analysis. Post hoc tests 
showed that having a single nation crew or a crew comprising more than two nations 
indicated a more positive attitude towards safety for three out of four factors. A possible 
explanation for this might be that if the crew hails from two nationalities, attitudes, values 
and norms might come into conflict and lead to stress (Paper 5: Håvold, 2007).  
 
Factor analyses on both an individual and national level (ecological level) of analysis were 
conducted (Paper 5: Håvold, 2007). The ecological factor analysis was performed according 
to Hofstede’s (2001) recommendations, and to empirically justify aggregation interrater 
reliability. Intra-class correlation coefficients were calculated and found to be within the 
normal range reported in the literature.  The individual and national level factor analyses 
showed that the variables and factors at the individual and national levels of analysis were 
different. See Paper 5 for a more detailed discussion. 
  79
 
By comparing Hofstede’s original country scores and scores calculated on sailors on 
Norwegian-owned vessels, the results suggested that sailors from collectivistic countries 
have become more individualistic, whereas sailors from more individualistic cultures had 
become more collectivistic (Paper 5: Håvold 2007). 
 
Correlations between the scores calculated on sailors on Norwegian-owned vessels and the    
correlations between the scores on the five national culture dimensions as obtained in 
Hofstede’s study (Power Distance; Individualism; Masculinity; Uncertainty Avoidance and 
Long-Term Orientation) showed that Power Distance and Uncertainty Avoidance were 
replicated best (Paper 5: Håvold 2007). 
 
The country scores calculated on sailors correlated with factors from the ecological factor 
analysis indicated that high power distance, high uncertainty avoidance and a high score on 
individualism were positive for safety (Paper 5: Håvold, 2007). 
 
Organisational sub-cultures (occupation, ship owners and vessels) showed significant 
differences for safety factors. All occupational groups shared the perception that safety was 
important; however, the officers and especially the masters reported a more positive attitude 
than the rest. By inspecting the items behind the significant differences between vessels, 
one could infer that the safety culture of the master and officers could be influential on the 
outcome. Another aspect to consider is that the differences in scores might be rooted in the 
nationality of the crew. The three vessels with an all-Indian crew showed the most positive 
safety culture whilst the vessel with an all-Norwegian crew showed the least positive safety 
culture. (Paper 4: Håvold 2005b).  
 
It appears that some factors/antecedents influence negative safety behaviour while others 
seem to influence positive safety behaviour. To avoid negative safety behaviour, it is 
important to work to make safety routines as clear, simple, and easy to understand as 
possible; to avoid boring and routine work as much as possible; to avoid protecting the 
management if anything bad happens; and to avoid a laissez-faire culture and fatalism. To 
influence positive safety behaviour, one should ensure that employees are satisfied with 
safety activities and the management’s attitudes and actions in regards to safety. This 
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corresponds with Herzberg’s famous findings on hygiene and motivation factors (Herzberg, 
1996; Paper 6: Håvold and Nesset, 2007). 
 
 
7.2 The safety orientation model revisited 
 
Figure 7.1 sums up the significant findings of the structural model based on the latent root 
short scale approach discussed in paper 6. It shows that only seven factors/antecedents and 
22 items are used to measure the four behavioural constructs in the refined model. The 
seven antecedents of the four behavioural constructs are well-defined concepts passing both 
convergent and discriminant validity tests. The SO scales shown in the figure are a 
graphical presentation of the significant findings reported in Table 10/ Paper 6. In the 
development of the SO scale, the author started with a total of 438 items. The items were 
first screened for redundancy, which led to a 96-item safety questionnaire and a safety 
orientation model that was presented in Figure 1.1.  Through refinement and development 
the final scales ended up with 22 items and seven factors.  
 
Figure 7.1 shows that two of the four behavioural variables measure positive safety 
behaviour: “Positive management behaviour” and “Precautious behaviour” (Williamson et 
al. 1997; Håvold, 2002) while the other two measuring negative safety behaviour: “Laissez-
faire behaviour” and “Laissez-faire behaviour under pressure” (Mearns et al. 2000). 
  
 
 
81
Laissez-faire behaviour
Context level 1 
- professional culture
- industry culture
- organisational culture
Context level 2 
- regulations
- markets
- national culture
Perception of safety 
instructions
Behaviour
Accidents / incidents
Job
dissatisfaction
Fatalism
Safety orientation 
Laissez-faire u/pressure behaviour
Conflict between 
safety and work
Safety orientation 
Behaviour
Accidents / incidents
Perception of safety
 instructions
Job
dissatisfaction
Fatalism
Context level 1 
- professional culture
- industry culture
- organisational culture
Context level 2 
- regulations
- markets
- national culture
Positive management behaviour
Perception of officers 
attitude to safety
Behaviour
Accidents / incidents
Satisfaction with
safety activities/rules
Context level 1 
- professional culture
- industry culture
- organisational culture
Context level 2 
- regulations
- markets
- national culture
Safety orientation 
Precautious behaviour
Perception of officers 
attitude to safety
Behaviour
Accidents / incidents
Satisfaction with
safety activities/rules
Job
dissatisfaction
Low work 
pressure
Context level 1 
- professional culture
- industry culture
- organisational culture
Context level 2 
- regulations
- markets
- national culture
Safety orientation 
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7.3 Practical use and implications of SO  
 
The empirical paper built on “large” samples drawn randomly with high participation. Paper 
4 built on 349 respondents from fifteen vessels (response rate of 60%), while Papers 5 and 6 
had 2558 respondents from 141 vessels and 16 shipping companies (response rate of 67%); 
both were well within recommendations from Spector (1992) and DeVellis, (1991), who 
suggested that 300 respondents was a minimum sample size for scale development. In 
addition, many nationalities were represented in both samples. The most common loss of 
external validity came from research on small samples obtained from a single geographical 
location. The result reported in these studies might be transferable across merchant shipping 
in general because of the industry characteristics. As mentioned in chapter 3.4, the 
technology and environment is relatively similar for all ships with the same standards for 
education and certificates, ships are classified by international classification societies, and  
most sailors are male, as in the samples used for Papers 4, 5 and 6.  
Most of the scales used in this research have been replicated from other industries. The 
exploratory factor analysis EFA (Table 1 in Paper 6) suggests the potential existence of at 
least some scales that can cover more than one industry. Many of the scales used in the SO 
questionnaire have been replicated from questionnaires used to measure safety 
climate/safety culture in the North Sea offshore sector, an industry with a demography that 
is not unlike merchant shipping.  
 
As a performance indicator 
How does the SO indicator correspond with the criteria for a good performance indicator 
(Kjellen, 2000)? 
SO can be quantified by applying a recognised data collection method or by observation. In 
Paper 6 (Håvold and Nesset, 2007) SO and its antecedents were measured/quantified 
through a survey using a Likert scale.  
 
The indicator should also be a valid indicator for the risk of loss by measuring what it is 
intended to measure (criterion-related validity) Criterion validity is discussed in Paper 6 
(Håvold and Nesset, 2007) and the conclusion was that it was satisfactory.   
 
The indicator seems to be sensitive to change to allow for early warnings, by capturing 
changes in a system or in the context. The SO indicator seems to be sensitive to change and 
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discriminates between vessels, occupations, and nationalities. The link between attitudes, 
behaviour and accidents was discussed in earlier chapters, and since attitudes are seen to be 
antecedents to behaviour and accidents, it is clear that changes in attitude can sound early 
warnings. The inclusion of contextual factors would be more complicated but not 
impossible.  
 
The indicator should be compatible with other performance indicators to prevent decision 
makers from receiving contradictory signals. The safety orientation indicator can be used in 
addition to and in co-ordination with other assessment tools.  
  
The indicator should be transparent and easily understood with respect to the user’s 
theoretical mental models and understanding, and it should be robust against manipulation.  
The safety orientation model and the safety orientation construct with its antecedents seem 
to be easy to grasp by the many employees, managers and safety practitioners I have 
presented it to. The indicator is transparent and since the indicator is constructed by asking 
questions of many people in the organisation using validated and reliability tested scales, it 
seems to be robust against manipulation.  All in all, the safety orientation indicator appears 
to support Kjellen’s six important criteria for a good performance indicator.  
 
I will suggest two additional requirements for a good performance indicator that appear to 
be important: It has to be simple in use. If the indicator is easy to use it can be used to 
monitor the business more closely and cheaply. It must also be easy to communicate 
because one of the important reasons to use performance indicators is to “educate” the staff 
and involve and motivate them to increase safety (see Figure7.2). The safety orientation 
indicator seems to support the two last criteria as well (see Figure 7.3).  
 
Continuous safety improvements  
For an organisation to become safety oriented, the idea of safety orientation has to be sold 
to the organisation. One has to remember that measuring safety orientation is only the 
beginning of the process of improving safety. In essence, the real work of setting priorities 
for action, making changes aimed at improving safety, and then to re-measure the effect 
begins after the results from the initiating “survey” has been communicated to the 
employees.  
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Initiatives to create and sustain a positive safety orientation should be a part of an ongoing 
process (continuous improvement) as is shown in Figure 7.2. Key elements in the process 
are: (1) Measure safety orientation, (2) Identify safety concerns and establish benchmarks, 
(3) Set goals and make priorities, (4) Establish forum for experience exchange (5) Provide 
training and education, (6) Re-measure safety orientation. 
 
The process in the left circle of the figure show how the continuous improvements can be 
implemented (like described in the SO definition); the right circle shows the measuring 
process necessary to benchmark improvements and decide on new goals. 
 
In benchmarking  
An important part of the SO process is benchmarking, because it can assess progress in 
improving safety. The absence of performance measures prevents the identification of best 
practices and impedes improvement in safety management throughout the organisation and 
between organisations. Table 7.1 shows how the sixteen ship owners represented in this 
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sample are rated on the seven factors represented in the four models in Figure 7.1. The 
highest and lowest values on each of the seven factors are shown in bold.  
 
Table 7.1 The sixteen ship owners in the sample benchmarked using seven SO factorsa 
Ship owner F1f F2f F3f F4f F5f F6f F7f 
1 4.91 4.80 4.06 2.77 3.61 2.55 3.43 
2 4.56 4.73 4.19 2.41 2.74 2.15 3.28 
3 5.16 5.07 4.65 2.36 3.42 2.11 3.09 
4 4.99 5.00 4.74 2.33 3.57 2.19 3.09 
5 4.99 4.93 4.58 2.34 3.55 2.13 3.12 
6 4.54 4.69 4.14 2.44 2.66 2.22 3.16 
7 5.12 5.13 4.68 2.25 3.59 2.08 3.11 
8 4.63 4.78 4.11 2.39 3.10 2.27 3.53 
9 5.32 5.20 4.61 2.11 3.41 1.90 2.89 
10 5.18 5.07 4.72 2.16 3.00 2.08 2.84 
11 4.13 4.64 3.79 3.03 2.66 2.26 3.52 
12 3.89 4.72 3.58 2.94 2.15 2.13 3.58 
13 4.48 4.80 3.78 2.33 2.40 2.14 3.35 
14 4.50 4.22 3.42 2.17 3.00 2.17 2.67 
15 4.99 4.94 4.73 2.52 3.90 2.35 3.40 
16 3.97 4.72 3.04 3.25 2.94 2.50 4.22 
Mean sample 4.84 4.91 4.39 2.41 3.19 2.17 3.21 
Mean 16 ship owners 4.71 4.84 4.18 2.48 3.11 2.20 3,27 
F1f: Satisfaction with safety activities; F2f: Perceptions of officers’ attitude to safety; F3f: Low work pressure; 
F4f: Job dissatisfaction; F5f: Fatalism; F6f: Perception of safety instructions; F7f: Conflict between safety and 
work. 
aThe highest and lowest values on each factor are shown in bold 
 
 
Figure 7.3 shows a “radar chart” for how the measured performance can be presented and 
compared.  
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The main advantage of using graphs like the ones in Figure 7.3 is for presentation and 
communication purposes. This work does not produce any predictors. Predictors can be 
used to tell results in advance with a high degree of precision.  The antecedents in Figure 
7.3 might become predictors with extensive use, experience, and research. Many of the 
antecedents (indicators) have been tested statistically in the papers, with significant 
association with outcome variables. These findings can then indicate the existence of certain 
conditions and be used to suggest alternative approaches.  
 
Despite some limitations, the SO construct developed through this study has potential 
for managerial applications. First, the scale presents a practical way of measuring the 
extent to which a company or department (vessel) has achieved a satisfactory level of 
safety. Second, the scale can be used in benchmarking as a KPI, or as an indicator in a 
balanced scorecard type of management tool. An analysis of data at different levels 
would allow an evaluation of overall SO performance, permitting managers to identify 
problem areas and concentrate resources on improving particular aspects of SO. Third, 
the results could be used in discussions with insurers, banks and customers to make 
safety work more visible. Fourth, by making safety work more visible, the workforce 
might become more motivated in the continuous process of improving safety. 
Organisations as such should therefore regularly survey and benchmark their SO and 
identify potential issues and improvements. 
By evaluating an organisation’s SO through a survey instrument, we are able to produce 
a picture of the vessel and/or ship owner at a particular point of time. This suggests that 
it can be used to plan and implement change. The measurement of safety orientation can 
provide management in an industry like shipping with the capacity to measure the 
degree to which the underlying dimensions in SO influence behaviour. We found that 
the scale was internally reliable and provided a valid construct when tested on a sample 
of seafarers on Norwegian-owned vessels. These results show that the questionnaire 
satisfies Baker’s criteria (1991) for an adequate scale: it has construct validity, it is 
internally reliable, and it appears to measure the same constructs when applied to new 
groups of employees, which Baker terms transferability. 
In order to prevent negative safety behaviour by the crew the most important initiatives 
seem to be reducing the general perception of job dissatisfaction, and making safety 
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instructions less confusing. However, activities directed at ease conflicts between safety 
and work, and actions that counteract to spread of “fatalism” may be useful in reducing 
negative safety behaviour. On the other hand, activities to stimulate positive safety 
behavior should mainly focus on the creation of satisfaction with safety rules and 
procedures among the crew - in particular actions giving support to safety 
representatives on board and the provision of good and adequate information on safety 
matters - and actions that support the creation of good and visible safety attitudes among 
the officers (the “opinion leaders”).  
 
However, one should also be aware of pitfalls. Examples of pitfalls might be: unreal 
expectations, difficulties in maintaining enthusiasm over a long period of time, reluctance 
on the part of employees in being measured, and the need for trust between management 
and employees in connection with implementation. It can be especially problematic to 
implement a system to measure safety orientation in organisations where employees have 
bad experiences or believe that the information could be used negatively as a “weapon”.   
 
 
7.4 Limitations of the results 
 
The use of self-reported measures to access all dimensions of the safety orientation model is 
a clear limitation of the current study. Estimates of relationship amongst the measures may 
therefore be confounded by common method of variance. Finding better ways / more 
objective measurements of safety behaviour and safety outcomes using new samples will be 
necessary to validate the impact of safety orientation on workplace outcomes.  
 
Another limitation of the study is its cross-sectional measurement. It was not possible to test 
all causal relationships proposed in the model and longitudinal assessment would have 
provided further validation of specific relationships. 
 
The theory of safety orientation as a process is in its infancy. Development of theory, 
measurements and documentation might improve our understanding of safety orientation. 
This in turn will improve the ability of managers to implement a higher degree of safety 
orientation in their organisations. 
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Further research and findings outside the fields covered in this thesis or included in 
publications in other languages than Scandinavian or English might extend or modify the 
model.  
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8 Conclusions and recommendations 
 
A safety orientation definition and theoretical model has been suggested using inductive 
reasoning and taking into account current research from several academic fields. However, 
the main source of information has been the safety climate and safety culture literature. 
Parts of this model have been tested empirically in the papers. The cultural paradigm used 
in this research is a version of functionalism, which looks at culture as an integrative 
mechanism where common values are the consistent shared element, and culture as such 
can be measured and changed. 
 
This research has not started from scratch, but has built on reusing whole scales employed 
by others, as has been recommended by Hale (2000). The scales in this study replicated 
surprisingly well, contrary to Hale’s observation that “Hardly any scales have been reused 
in the same form in several studies, and where that has happened, the factor structure and 
results have not usually been replicated” Hale, 2000, p. 11). (See Tables 1 and 2 in Paper 6). 
 
Notwithstanding the limitation of this study, the results provide strong empirical support for 
the proposed theoretical model. The study demonstrates that several of the proposed 
ascendants in the model influence the safety orientation construct, and that safety 
orientation influences safety behaviour. The findings described in this thesis provide 
valuable guidance for researchers and practitioners trying to identify areas in which they 
can improve safety at sea.  
 
It is essential that actions are taken as a result of the findings. Measuring safety orientation 
should not be a paper exercise; the entire process will be a waste of time and resources if 
the findings are not used for improvements or measuring towards a goal. The safety 
orientation measurement should be an integral part of the company’s management system.  
 
Further research can be proposed in several areas. The papers and thesis are only a step in 
developing a tool to measure safety orientation at sea. The next step might be to test parts of 
the model not covered in present research and papers. By looking at the preliminary safety 
orientation model in Fig. 1.1 and the model revisited in Fig. 7.1, the following research can 
be proposed:   
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• The model must be tested on other industries. To develop a core of generic factors 
and items for benchmarking purposes, a large-scale research project covering 
several industries and countries would be required.  
 
• The contextual influences resulting from industry culture, regulations and markets 
have to be tested. Do rules and regulations have an effect on safety behaviour and 
safety orientation? If so, why and how? Does competition influence safety 
behaviour and safety orientation?  If so, why and how? 
  
• A sailor’s loyalty can be to his country, to the shipping company, to his peers in the 
profession or to his colleagues. Multilevel analysis could be used to investigate the 
degree of influence these different potential loyalties have on safety orientation.  
 
• What are the impacts on safety behaviour and safety orientation of rapid 
organisational and technological change?  
 
• What effects will “safety campaigns” and/ or training directed to the profession, the 
industry or the organisation have on safety behaviour and safety orientation? 
 
• Do work on quality culture like quality campaigns and the introduction of TQM 
have an effect on safety behaviour and safety orientation? 
 
 
Additional proposals:  
• How will various preventive measures used in combinations function? For example 
how do attitude changes in combination with “attitude modification”, “structural 
modification” influence behaviour? 
 
• Studies using multiple methods, both quantitative and qualitative (data/method 
triangulation), should be launched at an international level. 
 
 
International bodies such as the IMO, IATA, IAEA, and the ILO could cooperate in 
financing international research in this area. 
 
The development of such a tool could be of special interest and use to safety-oriented 
companies for benchmarking, for insurance companies in underwriting and for 
classification companies in assessment. Nevertheless, as has been stated earlier, the process 
is in its beginning stages, and both more research as proposed above and development must 
be undertaken before a safety orientation tool could be a launched as a product.  
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